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California Supreme Court Survey
December 1985-February 1986
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I. ATTORNEYS' FEES
The contingency fee limitations of MICRA does not apply
where a plaintiff knowingly chooses to proceed on both
non-MICRA and MICRA theories in the same suit, and
subsequently obtains a recovery on the non-MICRA
theory: Waters v. Bourhis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Waters v. Bourhis,1 the court determined the proper application
of Business and Professions Code section 61462 in a malpractice ac-
tion for intentional misconduct3 as opposed to professional negli-
gence. 4 The court determined that intentional misconduct would be
a non-MICRA5 cause of action. The court also concluded that the
limitations of section 6146 would not apply if a plaintiff knowingly
consents to pursue a non-MICRA and a MICRA6 action, and subse-
1. 40 Cal. 3d 424, 709 P.2d 469, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1985). Justice Kaus delivered
the majority opinion in which Justices Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, and Lucas con-
curred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Bird con-
curred. Justice Kaus, a retired associate justice, was sitting under assignment by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Section 6146 provides in pertinent part:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for repre-
senting any person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury
or damage against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged
professional negligence in excess of the following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)
recovered.
(4) Ten percent of any amount on which recovery exceeds two hundred
thousand dollars ($200,000).
The limitation shall apply regardless of whether the recovery is by settle-
ment, arbitration, or judgment, or whether the person for whom the recovery
is made is a responsible adult, an infant, or a person of unsound mind.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
3. "Misconduct" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as: "[a] transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; its synonyms are
misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, of-
fense, but not negligence or carelessness .... '. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (5th ed.
1979).
4. Section 6146(c)(3) defines professional negligence as:
[a] negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering
of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a per-
sonal injury or wrongful death, provided that the services are within the scope
of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any
restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
5. MICRA is an acronym for the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of
1975. Section 6146 of the Business and Professions Code is a provision of this act.
6. For an overview on how the various states have handled the medical malprac-
tice crisis with legislation, see Note, Medical Malpractice Statutes: A Retrospective
Analysis, 3 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693 (1984) (limitations on recovery, periodic payments,
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quently obtained a recovery based on the non-MICRA theory.7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Ray Bourhis, was an attorney who represented the
plaintiff, Barbara Waters, in a previous suit for medical malpractice
against a psychiatrist, Dr. Shonkwiler, for alleged sexual miscon-
duct.8 The plaintiff first consulted the defendant about one year af-
ter she had stopped seeing Shonkwiler and had helped the police
with a criminal investigation of the psychiatrist.
Bourhis contends that when plaintiff described the circumstances
of Shonkwiler's sexual activities, he informed her that it was proba-
bly not medical negligence. Consequently, he advised plaintiff of sec-
tion 6146 of the Business and Professions Code, indicating he would
not represent her under its limitations. The defendant instead of-
fered to take the case on an hourly or contingency basis.9 The plain-
tiff agreed to a contingency basis and signed an agreement to that
effect.10 The plaintiff in the present action claimed that Bourhis
never advised her of the lack of medical negligence or the existence
of section 6146. The complaint defendant filed against Shonkwiler
sought damages on three legal theories: "(1) negligence, (2) breach of
duty of good faith, and (3) intentional or reckless infliction of emo-
tional distress."
11
In discovery, the defendant learned of Shonkwiler's $200,000 limit
on his malpractice policy. The insurer subsequently settled with de-
fendant for the $200,000 policy limit. The defendant contended he re-
tained his fee,12 explaining to the plaintiff how section 6146 did not
contingency fees, statutes of limitation, arbitration panels, and pretrial screening
panels).
7. Waters, 40 Cal. 3d at 437, 709 P.2d at 478, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
8. The psychiatrist allegedly induced the plaintiff to engage in sexual conduct
with him under the guise of behavior modification therapy. He also allegedly coerced
the plaintiff into sexual relations with threats of institutionalization for failure to co-
operate. Id. at, 428, 709 P.2d at 471, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
9. The defendant agreed to work for an hourly rate of $50 or $65 per hour, or on
the standard personal injury contingency fee, "which provided for fees of (1) 33 1/3
percent if recovery was obtained before the filing of a lawsuit, and (2) 40 percent after
such a suit was filed." Id. at 428-29, 709 P.2d at 472, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
10. See 7 CAL. JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law §§ 252-258 (1973 & Supp. 1985) (contin-
gent fees); 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 313-323 (1980 & Supp. 1985) (contingent
fee contracts).
11. Waters, 40 Cal. 3d at 429, 709 P.2d at 472, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
12. The defendant retained 40% of the $200,000 settlement ($80,000) plus his out-
of-pocket expenses ($1,797.30), while the plaintiff received the balance of $118,202.70.
Id. at 430, 709 P.2d at 473, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
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apply to her case, 13 and that she should seek outside advice for ques-
tions about the fee.
Thereafter, plaintiff sought outside legal advice which led to this
action, claiming defendant retained fees of $18,000 more than was al-
lowed under section 6146. The defendant answered, contending that
section 6146 was unconstitutional. He also moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the previous suit was not based on "profes-
sional negligence" as defined by section 6146.14 The trial court
granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor and the plaintiff
appealed from the judgment.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The court first disposed of the constitutional claim in accordance
with Roa v. Lodi Medical Group Inc.,15 in which the court held that
section 6146 was not unconstitutional.16 The court then focused on
the application of section 6146 to the instant case, which was based on
intentional misconduct as well as professional negligence.
The defendant advanced several theories in support of summary
judgment. He contended that, as a matter of law, the record showed
that the earlier action was based on intentional misconduct, and not
professional negligence. The court found this theory to be without
merit. The court reasoned that because the case was settled, there
was no way to determine upon which theory the psychiatrist's liabil-
ity rested. Even if intentional misconduct had been established,
plaintiff probably could have recovered in part on a professional neg-
ligence theory.i7
Second, the defendant argued that because the psychiatrist's acts
were restricted by his licensing agency, MICRA did not apply. Sec-
tion 6146 excludes from its limitations acts or omissions which are
13. The defendant gave a letter to the plaintiff, explaining the fee breakdown and
why section 6146 did not apply. The defendant maintained that although both negli-
gence and intentional misconduct were alleged on the complaint, section 6146 only ap-
plied to standard medical negligence cases and not in cases such as this where the
sexual conduct is in violation of a restriction imposed by Business and Professions
Code section 730. Id. at 430 n.5, 709 P.2d at 473 n.5, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 670 n.5.
14. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
15. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985) (holding that section 6146,
which places limitations on the amount of fees an attorney may obtain in a medical
malpractice action when he represents a party on a contingency fee basis, is not uncon-
stitutional as a denial of due process, violation of equal protection, or violation of sepa-
ration of powers doctrine).
16. See Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal
Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 829 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980) (plaintiff
could maintain civil action for malpractice against psychiatrist even though psychia-
trist could be subject to criminal and professional sanctions); American Employer's
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 105 Cal. App. 3d 94, 102, 163 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (1980) (showing of
willfulness does not as a matter of law negate negligence).
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within "any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed
hospital."1s The defendant contended that the psychiatrist's sexual
misconduct was a basis for disciplinary action, restricted by the "li-
censing agency." The court found that section 6146 was only "inap-
plicable when a provider operates in a capacity for which he is not
licensed - for example, when a psychologist performs heart sur-
gery." 19 The court reasoned that, in the instant case, the psychiatrist
was licensed to provide the type of treatment out of which the mis-
conduct arose. Therefore, this exception does not apply.
Third, the defendant argued section 6146 does not apply to cases
where a plaintiff's recovery was based on both non-MICRA and
MICRA actions. The court could find no basis for limiting attorneys'
fees where a MICRA and a non-MICRA claim are both asserted in
one suit. Therefore, the fee limitations of section 6146 should not ap-
ply when the litigant is only successful with the non-MICRA claim.20
The court did, however, conclude that this finding would apply only
in cases where the plaintiff knowingly chose to proceed on both
causes of action.2 1 In the case at bar, the question of whether the
plaintiff "knowingly consented" was still in dispute. Therefore, the
court determined that summary judgment was not appropriate and
reversed the judgment of the trial court.
IV. THE DISSENT
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority holding that section 6146
does not apply to a non-MICRA recovery where the plaintiff know-
ingly consents to proceed on both types of actions. However, he dis-
agreed with the majority's claim that the psychiatrist's sexual
misconduct arose out of the services he was licensed to perform. Jus-
tice Mosk asserted that this type of sexual misconduct was "entirely
outside the scope of treatment."2 2 Most importantly, he felt this
court was bound by the finding of the trial court that plaintiff's dam-
18. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
19. Waters, 40 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 709 P.2d at 477-78, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
20. Id. at 437, 709 P.2d at 477, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
21. [A]n attorney who in such a case seeks to collect a larger fee than that
authorized by section 6146 must specifically advise the client or potential cli-
ent of the pros and cons of alternative litigation strategies, including potential
attorney fees, and obtain the client's consent to pursue and settle a non-
MICRA action as well as a MICRA claim.
Id. at 438, 709 P,2d at 479, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (footnote ommitted). See also CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6147 (West Supp. 1986) (regulation of contingency fee contracts).
22. Waters, 40 Cal. 3d at 439, 709 P.2d at 480, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). See, e.g., Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 949, 123
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age did not result from mere professional negligence, but intentional
conduct. Therefore, the summary judgment was correct and should
not have been reversed.
V. IMPACT
The court's holding could result in many personal injury attorneys
asserting both MICRA and non-MICRA actions in order to avoid the
limitations of section 6146. If the case goes to trial, the cause of ac-
tion that succeeds will determine whether section 6146 applies. How-
ever, in the case of a settlement, the limits of section 6146 could be
avoided because settlements do not establish on which theory the re-
covery is based. This could be an area for potential abuse of the limi-
tations imposed by MICRA in malpractice actions. The provision
that the plaintiff must knowingly consent to proceed on both theories
will hopefully provide a check for potential abuse by attorneys.
MARIE P. HENWOOD
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts over alleged violations of civil provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
and the state antitrust statute applies to professionals:
Cianci v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cianci v. Superior Court1 the court addressed two distinct ques-
tions. First, the court determined whether state courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction with federal courts over the civil provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2 In
deciding in the affirmative, the court noted that there is a presump-
tion of concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts un-
less Congress either explicitly or implicitly confines jurisdiction to
the federal courts.3 Second, the court examined California's antitrust
statute4 and considered whether it applies to professionals. In over-
Cal. Rptr. 563, 575 (1975) (sexual misconduct was not considered "acceptable psycho-
logical treatment").
1. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985). The majority opinion
was by Justice Mosk, with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Broussard, Reynoso, and
Kawaichi concurring. Justice Lucas filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice
Kawaichi was assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
3. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 377-78, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16758 (West 1964 & Supp. 1986). California's
antitrust laws are commonly referred to as the Cartwright Act.
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ruling Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association,5 the
court held that, in light of criticism of Willis6 and the United States
Supreme Court's subsequent holding in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,7 the Cartwright Act does apply to professionals.
II. FACTS
The case arose out of a dispute over the establishment, funding,
and operation of a specialized medical treatment department at a
hospital. Several medical doctors filed a complaint against other doc-
tors seeking dissolution of a limited partnership, accounting, dam-
ages, and the imposition of a constructive trust. The petitioner, in
response to this complaint, filed a cross-complaint alleging, among
other things, violation of and conspiracy to violate both the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the state's anti-
trust statute - the Cartwright Act.
The real parties filed a demurrer to these claims. In response to
the RICO claim, the parties argued that federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over RICO actions. In response to the antitrust claim
they argued that, as medical professionals, they were exempt from
the application of the Cartwright Act. The trial court sustained the
demurrers on these grounds and petitioner, Cianci, sought supreme
court review of these rulings by writ.8
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
1. The RICO Issue
In stating that RICO jurisdiction was an issue of first impression,
the court emphasized its importance to the profession and the public
because of its impact on the interests of those whose businesses suf-
fer injury as a result of racketeering activities.9 The object of RICO
is to prevent and punish racketeering activity.10 The statutory
scheme includes both criminal and civil provisions. Section 1964(c) of
5. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962).
6. See Comment, Should the Medical Profession be Exempt from California Anti-
trust Law? Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association Reexamined, 7 W.
ST. L. REV. 91 (1979).
7. 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (professionals held to be within the Sherman Act even
though they were not expressly included).
8. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 908, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
9. Id.
10. Id. Racketeering activity is defined as any act in violation of several classes of
1111
the RICO act provides that: "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 . . . may sue there-
for in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."'"
Justice Mosk, writing for the Cianci majority, concluded that the
civil provisions of the statute implicitly granted federal courts juris-
diction over RICO cases. 12 According to the United States Supreme
Court, "state courts may assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a
federal cause of action absent [a] provision by Congress to the con-
trary or [a] disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and
state-court adjudication."13
The presumption that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts was then espoused as a rationale for the court's
holding that RICO cases can be heard in state courts. The court
noted that Congress had not implicitly or explicitly confined jurisdic-
tion to federal courts and that, absent such action by Congress, "some
strong showing of need for exclusive jurisdiction is required to over-
come [the] presumption.' 14 The court added that the language of the
statute itself implies that state courts are to have concurrent jurisdic-
tion. "RICO is to be read broadly."' 5 The court noted that Congress
unmistakably intended that section 1964(c) be widely construed to ef-
fectuate its remedial purposes and that exclusive jurisdiction in fed-
eral courts would frustrate or limit those purposes.16
The court unilaterally rejected all of the policy arguments put for-
ward by the real parties in favor of limiting RICO litigation to
federal courts.17 The parties argued that RICO claims were incom-
patible with state court adjudication for the following reasons: the
necessity of uniform application of the statute; federal judges are su-
perior to state judges because of their familiarity with the RICO stat-
state criminal laws or of several specified federal criminal provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1982).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (West 1984).
12. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 377-78, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
13. Id. at 910, 710 P.2d at 377, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 477-78 (1981)). See generally Redish & Muench, Adjudication
of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976).
14. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (quoting Redish
& Muench, supra note 13, at 325 n.63).
15. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582. See also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3292, 3296 (1985). See also Note, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co.: The Requirement of Prior Criminal Convictions in Private RICO Actions,
63 N.C.L. REV. 1033 (1985).
16. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 912-13, 710 P.2d at 379, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
17. In doing so, the court rejected the reasoning of County of Cook v. Midcon
Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. 111. 1983), and Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman &
Leicher, 108 A.D.2d 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1985), stating that their reasoning contained
"superficial appeal." Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 911, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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ute; and the greater hospitality of federal courts to federal law
claims. The court stated that these arguments did not meet the bur-
den of overcoming the presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Thus, whether Congress meant to allow RICO litigation in state
courts, the California Supreme Court is ready and willing to hear
such claims.
2. The Antitrust Issue
After disposing of the RICO issue, the court subsequently advanced
to its interpretation of the Cartwright Act and its applicability to pro-
fessionals.' 8 The court recognized that the plain language of the Act
reveals that its coverage extends to all economic combinations, re-
gardless of the nature of the occupation of the combining parties.1 9
This language is comprehensive, and limiting it to not encompass pro-
fessionals because they were not specifically stated, would undermine
the purpose of the Act.
18. The Cartwright Act states: "Except as provided in this chapter, every trust is
unlawful, against public policy and void." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16726 (West
1964).
19. Cianci, 4:0 Cal. 3d at 917, 710 P.2d at 382-83, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83. The act
provides:
A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons for
any of the following purposes:
(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
(b) To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise
or of any commodity.
(c) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale
or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
(d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or con-
sumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or com-
modity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or
consumption in this State.
(e) To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obliga-
tions or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any
combination of any of the following:
(1) Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or any
commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consump-
tion below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
(2) Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or
transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
(3) Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation
between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to pre-
clude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchas-
ers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or
commodity.
(4) Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that
they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or
commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 1964).
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The court found that the goal of the Act was to protect consum-
ers20 and noted that consumer interests are significantly implicated
in the provision of services by professionals - especially doctors.
Thus, the court reasoned that the legislature in enacting the Cart-
wright Act must have intended for the Act to apply to profes-
sionals.21
The court examined the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar22 and found its reasoning to be suffi-
ciently persuasive to warrant its application to the Cartwright Act.
Consequently, the court proceeded to overrule Willis v. Santa Ana
Community Hospital Association,23 reasoning that its rationale was
unsound and unconvincing.
The court rejected the real parties' two primary arguments for ex-
empting professionals. First, the parties argued that since the legisla-
ture had modified the Act in 1976 and 1984 without changing the
provision interpreted by the Willis court, it was aware of Willis and
thereby acquiesced to its holding.24 The court held that these amend-
ments did not approve the blanket exemption for professionals cre-
ated by the Willis court.
Second, it was argued that the doctrine of stare decisis prevented
the court's reconsideration of the issue settled by the Willis case.
The court, in rejecting this argument, again turned to the United
States Supreme Court.25 The court noted that it should not hide be-
hind stare decisis, but should reconsider prior court construction of
legislative intent when such a reconsideration is dictated by time and
experience. 26 The court then concluded that the Cartwright Act ap-
plies to professionals and overruled the Willis case. 27
B. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although he concurred in the majority conclusion that the Cart-
20. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 918, 710 P.2d at 383, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
21. To bolster its reasoning, the court used a statement by a congressman who au-
thored a bill similar to the Cartwright Act that was offered as an unsuccessful substi-
tute to the Sherman Act. Id. at 919, 710 P.2d at 394, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 684. In light of
the great weight of the arguments existing in United States Supreme Court case law,
common law, and analogies to the Sherman Act, this argument appears to be tenuous
at best and wholly unnecessary.
22. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
23. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962).
24. The court cited People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1969) for the proposition that mere silence to a court's construction of a statute
does not constitute acquiescence. See also Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 923 n.7, 710 P.2d at 386
n.7, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 586 n.7 (examination of the legislative amendments to the Act).
25. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (rejection of a simi-
lar stare decisis contention).
26. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 924, 710 P.2d at 387-88, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
27. Chief Justice Bird concurred with the Mosk opinion, along with Justices
Broussard, Reynoso, and Kawaichi.
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wright Act applies to the medical profession, Justice Lucas vehe-
mently dissented to the holding that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts to decide RICO claims.28 Arguing
that RICO's legislative history clearly establishes exclusive federal
jurisdiction, Justice Lucas noted that three of the four cases which
have addressed the issue in other jurisdictions have concluded that
jurisdiction was exclusive. 29 Lucas believed the reasoning of the
three cases in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction to be analytical
and persuasive, while the reasoning of the fourth case 30 contained no
analysis of the relevant factors. 31
RICO's language was then compared to the federal antitrust act.3 2
Lucas argued that the similarity of the two statutes, one of which has
been uniformly held to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction, indicates
that the legislature intended both to grant federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction. This similarity was found to provide an "inescapable im-
plication" of exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO claims.33
Lucas then addressed the complexity of the RICO statute and its
need for uniformity of interpretation and application. 34 Justice Lu-
cas concluded that the complexity of RICO adjudication necessarily
involves the interpretation of other uniquely federal statutes, thereby
complicating the already complex statute. Thus, Lucas concurred
with the holdings of the cases supporting exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion35 and declined to join in the RICO "fray." 36
28. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 925, 710 P.2d at 388, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 588. Justice Grodin
concurred with Justice Lucas' dissent.
29. The three cases cited by Justice Lucas to rebut the concurrent jurisdiction pre-
sumption are Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985);
County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Greenview Trading
Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, 108 A.D.2d 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1985).
30. Luebke v. Marine Nat'l Bank of Neenah, 567 F. Supp 1460 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
31. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 925-26, 710 P.2d at 388-89, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
33. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 926, 710 P.2d at 388-89, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
34. Justice Lucas quoted a statement by Professor G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel
to the Senate subcommittee which proposed RICO. Blakey stated that "courts can in-
fer from the statute that if Congress had thought about it, they would have made juris-
diction exclusive." Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 929, 710 P.2d at 391, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
35. See supra note 29.
36. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 930, 710 P.2d at 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 592. In light of fed-
eral case law, the statutory interpretations which support exclusive jurisdiction, and
the strong arguments exposed by the dissent in Cianci, it is increasingly likely that the
Supreme Court of the United States or Congress will take steps to clarify this issue.
The result will probably be a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction in order to quell
the increasing amount of confusion surrounding civil RICO litigation.
1115
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's determination to grant parties in civil RICO actions
concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal court will allow litigants
the opportunity to select the forum in which they choose to bring
RICO actions. This will, in all likelihood, give rise to complications
and irregularities in the application of federal RICO law. It is too
soon, however, to determine the full impact of this decision on RICO
litigation.
The court's additional and unanimous ruling that the Cartwright
Antitrust Act applies to professionals is a reasonable and justified de-
parture from its previous holding in the Willis case. This holding
will protect consumers from antitrust violations in all areas, includ-
ing the medical and legal professions.
CHRISTIE A. MOON
III. CONTRACTS
Arbitration clause in a health service contract that
covers any claim "arising from rendition or failure to
render services" does not apply to a claim against the
health care provider for negligent employment and
supervision of an orderly accused of sexually assaulting
a patient: Victoria v. Superior Court.
In Victoria v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 734, 710 P.2d 833, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1985), the supreme court held that an arbitration clause in a
health care service contract that covers any claim "arising from ren-
dition or failure to render services" did not include a claim brought
by a patient against the health care provider for negligent hiring and
supervision of an employee who had allegedly sexually assaulted that
patient. The court based its decision upon the contract's adhesive
characteristics and ambiguity, and upon the fact that the health care
provider was in the better bargaining position and responsible for the
ambiguity.
Petitioner was admitted to Kaiser Foundation Hospital for brain
surgery in August of 1984. While recovering from her operation, she
was allegedly sexually assaulted on several occasions by a hospital or-
derly. Petitioner sued both the orderly and Kaiser. Included in the
complaint were two causes of action against Kaiser for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress and negligent selection and supervision
of the employee who had allegedly assaulted her. There was a Group
Medical and Hospital Agreement between Kaiser and Southern Cali-
fornia Edison Company. The petitioner's father was employed by
Edison, and as a family dependent, the petitioner became a qualified
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Kaiser member under the agreement. Included in the agreement was
an arbitration clause which provided that:
Any claim arising from alleged violation of a legal duty incident to this Agree-
ment shall be submitted to binding arbitration if the claim is asserted: (1) By a
Member . . . [;] (2) On account of death, mental disturbance or bodily injury
arising from rendition or failure to render services under the Agreement, ir-
respective of the legal theory upon which the claim is asserted; (3) For mone-
tary damages exceeding the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Court;
and (4) Agadnst one or more of the following ... : (a) Health Plan, (b) Hospi-
tals, (c) Medical Group, (d) Any Physician, or (e) Any employee of the
foregoing.
Victoria, 40 Cal. 3d at 738, 710 P.2d at 834, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 2 (empha-
sis added).
Kaiser answered the complaint and moved to stay the action and
compel arbitration, arguing that the complaint fell within the arbitra-
tion clause of the agreement. The trial court granted Kaiser's motion
and ordered that the matter be submitted to arbitration. From this
order, the petitioner sought a writ of mandate requiring the trial
court to set aside its order and exercise its jurisdiction to hear the
case.
The petitioner argued that the allegations in her complaint were
outside the arbitration clause in the agreement. She claimed that the
arbitration clause was not specific enough to satisfy the relevant stat-
utory requirements. She also claimed that, according to the arbitra-
tion clause, in order for a claim to be submitted to mandatory
arbitration it must arise from services pursuant to the agreement.
Because her suit was not related to the rendition or failure to
render medical or hospital services, she claimed that the arbitration
clause did not apply. She further argued that the agreement was an
adhesion contract, mandating that the ambiguity be resolved against
Kaiser since it had the stronger bargaining position. However, Kaiser
claimed that the arbitration clause covered all its activities, and
therefore the claim for negligent employment arose out of its obliga-
tion to provide hospital services within the meaning of the arbitration
clause.
In resolving the controversy, the court balanced the general policy
in favor of arbitration against ordinary contract principles, which re-
quire agreements to be interpreted to reflect the intent of the parties.
While policy favors arbitration, the court acknowledged it does so
only when the parties voluntarily agree to arbitrate. Using standard
contract interpretation principles, the court declared that ambiguities
should be resolved against the party responsible for them - the
drafter.
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The supreme court noted that many arbitration agreements be-
tween health care providers and patients are governed by Civil Pro-
cedure Code section 1295. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West
1982). Kaiser is exempt from this provision, but is still required to
comply with Health & Safety Code sections 1363(a)(10) and 1373(i),
which require that Kaiser include a disclosure form stating that the
plan utilizes arbitration to resolve disputes and stating the types of
disputes subject to arbitration. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1363(a)(10) & 1373(i) (West Supp. 1986).
The court held that the agreement was not an adhesion contract
because Kaiser and Edison were of apparent equal bargaining
strength. While the agreement as a whole was not an adhesion con-
tract, the court held it had "adhesive characteristics." The court
noted that the arbitration clause was a small part of a lengthy stan-
dardized form contract, and it was unknown whether Edison could
have procured coverage for its employees without the arbitration
clause.
Because the arbitration clause of the agreement had "adhesive
characteristics" and because ambiguities must be construed against
the drafter, the court held that the petitioner's claim was not subject
to mandatory arbitration. The petitioner's claim did not relate to fi-
nancial disputes or medical malpractice claims, as it was for breach of
a common law duty to exercise due care in the hiring and supervision
of an employee. It had nothing to do, held the court, with providing
or failing to provide services. Accordingly, the court issued a writ of
mandate directing that the order to compel arbitration be set aside
and ordered the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction over the
matter.
JAMES G. BOHM
IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Right of an accused misdemeanant to appointed counsel
attaches even in informal, inferior courts unless it is
effectively waived: In re Kevin G.
In In re Kevin G., 40 Cal. 3d 644, 709 P.2d 1315, 221 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1985), the supreme court was asked to examine the scope of the
sixth amendment right to counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
issue addressed was whether a juvenile accused of a misdemeanor,
who elects to proceed informally before a traffic hearing officer, is
entitled to court-appointed counsel if he cannot afford to retain coun-
sel. The majority concluded that the defendant, Kevin G., had this
right and that he did not effectively waive it.
In 1981, the defendant was convicted of a juvenile charge of driving
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under the influence of alcohol in Merced County. He subsequently
moved to have the conviction set aside because he was not provided
with counsel or given the opportunity to waive this right. At the
time of the original conviction, the defendant had signed a juvenile
traffic court waiver form. The form stated, in pertinent part: "I
freely and voluntarily waive my rights to a hearing by the Juvenile
Court . . and I waive my rights to be represented by an attorney."
Kevin G., 40 Cal. 3d at 646, 709 P.2d at 1316, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
As a result of this waiver, the state argued that the defendant
elected to have his misdemeanor procedurally converted to an infrac-
tion. It was further argued that, due to this election, the defendant's
rights were equal to those of one accused of an infraction. Con-
versely, the defendant maintained that because he had been charged
with a misdemeanor, he had the right to court-appointed counsel.
Since the defendant was never advised of this right, he also argued
that effective waiver was not possible.
In affirming the lower court and upholding the defendant's right to
counsel, the court ruled that courts may not replace misdemeanor
charges with infraction charges in order to avoid constitutional re-
quirements. Although it recognized the importance of establishing
informal traffic proceedings, the court stated that it would not allow
constitutional rights to suffer in the name of efficiency. Finally, the
court found the waiver form inherently deficient. The court noted
that even though a minor charged with a misdemeanor has the right
to counsel, he could choose to waive that right and proceed under an
informal system. Thus, if the waiver had either included a provision
informing defendant of his right to counsel at the informal hearing,
or officially converting the charge from a misdemeanor to an infrac-
tion, then the Merced County procedure would have been
constitutional.
This case is evidence of the unambiguous stand the court has taken
when the right to counsel is at issue. The constitutional right of an
accused misdemeanant to counsel clearly includes the right to ap-
pointed counsel if he cannot afford to retain counsel. This right at-
taches even in inferior courts, unless a knowing and intelligent
waiver is made. The court will not tolerate distortion or manipula-
tion of this rule.
CHRISTIE A. MOON
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B. Public school officials may search a student if they
have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
student has engaged, or is engaging, in proscribed
activity: In re William G.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re William G.,1 the supreme court held that under the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution2 and article I, section
13 of the California Constitution3 a public school official can search a
juvenile student without a warrant if the school official has reason-
able suspicion to believe that the student is violating a school regula-
tion or a criminal statute. The court further required that the
reasonable suspicion be supported by articulable facts and that the
type of search be "reasonably related" to its objectives and not be
"excessively" intrusive.4
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
On the date of the alleged offense, William G. was a sixteen year
old high school student. At about 1:00 p.m., when classes were nor-
mally in session, the high school's assistant principal saw William and
two other students walking through the campus. The assistant prin-
cipal approached the students to ask them why they were not in
class. While approaching them, he noticed that William was holding
a small black bag with an odd-looking bulge.5 Upon asking them
why they were not in class, the assistant principal noticed that Wil-
liam had placed the bag behind his back. When asked what he had,
the minor replied, "Nothing." 6 After some discussion William was
1. 40 Cal. 3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985). The opinion was au-
thored by Justice Reynoso, with Justices Broussard, Grodin, and Kaus concurring.
Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, and Justice
Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. This provision states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a
warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or afirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and
things to be seized.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
4. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 564, 709 P.2d at 1296, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
5. This bulge was later determined to be a vinyl calculator case. Id. at 555, 709
P.2d at 1289, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
6. Id.
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taken to the assistant principal's office, where the bag was searched.
Four baggies of marijuana, weighing in total less than one-half of an
ounce, a grun weight scale, and some cigarette papers were found.7
The police were called, and William was arrested.
At his adjudication hearing William moved to suppress this evi-
dence on the ground that it was obtained by an illegal search, arguing
that the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures applied to public school officials, and that the search which
was conducted upon him was unreasonable. At this hearing, the as-
sistant principal testified that he had no prior information which
caused him to believe that the minor possessed marijuana, but it was
his normal practice to question students who were not in class.8
The juvenile court found the search to be not only reasonable, but
necessary on the part of the assistant principal in fulfilling his duties.
Thus, the court denied the motion and William was declared a ward
of the juvenile court and placed on three years probation. He subse-
quently appealed this ruling.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In setting a standard for a legal search of a minor conducted by a
school official under relevant state and federal constitutional provi-
sions,9 the court first determined whether these constitutional provi-
sions applied to the case at hand. This required a finding that: (1)
minor school children are "persons" within the meaning of the state
and federal constitutions; and (2) the actions of public school officials
are considered "governmental action."
In addressing the first preliminary consideration, the court held
that "[i]t is well settled that minor students are 'persons' under our
state and federal constitutions and therefore possess fundamental
constitutional rights which the state must respect."1o Included in
these rights, the court held, was the protection from unreasonable
7. Id. In a subsequent police pat-down search for weapons, $135 was discovered
in William's pockets.
8. Id. at 556, 709 P.2d at 1289, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
10. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 556, 709 P.2d at 1290, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The
court, in elaborating on this proposition, quoted the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), which stated that
"[c]onstitutiona] rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 556-57,
709 P.2d at 1290, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (quoting Darnforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
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searches and seizures provided in the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution. 1 The court acknowledged that the constitutional
rights of minors need not necessarily be the same as those of adults.12
However, the court held that minors still have rights, which they do
not lose by entering the school grounds.
In determining that the acts of the assistant principal should be
considered "governmental action," thus falling under the constitu-
tional proscriptions against unreasonable search and seizure, the
court relied on the recent United States Supreme Court case of New
Jersey v. T.L.O.13 In that case, it was held that public school officials
were governed by the fourth amendment. Furthermore, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that public school officials were subject to
the proscriptions of article I, section 13 because they are the agents of
the government by the nature of their employment, their licensing is
controlled by the state, they must implement state prescribed pro-
grams, the educational system is primarily funded by the state, and
the state compels students to attend school.14
Concluding that minor school children are "persons" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment and article I, section 13, and that
the acts of public school officials were governmental action, the court
next had to determine the proper standard to be applied in deciding
whether this type of a search was reasonable. In making this deci-
sion, the court used a balancing test - the interests of the govern-
ment in protecting the health and welfare of all students were
weighed against the privacy interests of the individual student.15
In determining the rights of the individual student, the court held
that "[t]he right to privacy is vitally important," and "[tihe privacy of
a student, the very young or the teenager, must be respected."16 On
11. The court inferred these rights to privacy. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 557, 709
P.2d at 1290, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (holding that minors have a right to obtain contraceptives). For a general dis-
cussion of search and seizure law and minors, see S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES
§§ 3.6-3.7 (1985).
12. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 558, 709 P.2d at 1291, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 122. The court
noted that minors' rights may be restricted to promote their health and welfare. See
generally In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
13. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). For a discussion on "private" searches versus "govern-
mental" searches, see 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.6 (1978 & Supp. 1986). See also 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES &
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 2.3(c) (1985).
14. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 559-60, 709 P.2d at 1291-92, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
The court noted that earlier California cases were contrary to this holding. See In re
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969). See also J. VANDEKAMP,
LAW IN THE SCHOOL: A GUIDE FOR CALIFORNIA TEACHERS, PARENTS & STUDENTS 62-65
(4th ed. 1984).
15. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 562, 709 P.2d at 1294, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
16. Id. at 563, 709 P.2d at 1294-95, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
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the other hand, in determining the rights of all students, the court
stated that "the right of all students to a school environment fit for
learning cannot be questioned.'1 7 With respect to the right to have a
fit learning environment, the court stated that public schools assume
a duty to protect the students from the dangers of anti-social activi-
ties. This restricts the students' zones of privacy.' 8
Weighing these competing interests, the court concluded "that
searches of students by the public school officials must be based on a
reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched have
engaged, or are engaging, in a . . . violation of a school . . . regula-
tion, or a criminal statute ..... ,19 The court further held that in
support of this reasonable suspicion, there must be supporting ar-
ticulable facts. Without such facts, the search is unlawful. The court
noted that this standard was consistent with that which was recently
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v.
TL.O..2o The court also put limitations on the types of searches
which could be conducted, stating that the search methods must be
related to its objectives and must not be overly intrusive considering
the age and sex of the student and the graveness of the offense.
Under this standard, public school officials need not obtain a
warrant.
The court specifically rejected previous, "less stringent" standards
which have been used by the California Court of Appeal. For exam-
ple, the court overruled the "reasonable" standard adopted in the de-
cision of In re Thomas G.,21 the "good cause" standard of In re Fred
C,22 and the two-pronged test (the search must have been within the
scope of the school's duties and the search must have been reason-
17. Id. at 563, 709 P.2d at 1295, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 126. In holding this, the court
acknowledged that attendance is mandatory and that learning cannot properly exist
without the physical and mental well-being of the children. Id. See CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28(c), which provides that "students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior
high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are
safe, secure and peaceful." Id.
18. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 563, 709 P.2d at 1295, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 126. See also
Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376
(1970) (holding that school authorities have a duty to provide safe schools).
19. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 564, 709 P.2d at 1295, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (emphasis
added). The court specifically avoided the issue of which standard should be applied
where law enforcement officials are involved from the beginning of a student search,
or where the school officials act in conjunction with law enforcement. Id. at 562 n.12,
709 P.2d at 1294 n.12, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 125 n.12.
20. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
21. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1196, 1199, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362, 364 (1970).
22. 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972).
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able) stated in the case of In re Christopher W.23
In applying the newly articulated "reasonable suspicion" standard
to the case at hand, the court determined that the search of William
was illegal. There was no prior knowledge of the juvenile's connec-
tion with drugs, and the court felt that the assistant principal did not
have a reasonable suspicion to conduct the search just because Wil-
liam was not in class.24 Because the search was illegal, the evidence
which was a product of that search was inadmissible, thus mandating
reversal of the superior court's order.25
IV. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opin-
ion. She dissented on the grounds that she believes article I, section
13 should adhere to a probable cause standard in the school setting.26
She concurred with the majority in their reversal of the superior
court's order.27
Justice Mosk, believing that the assistant principal had a reason-
able suspicion to conduct the search, wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. While he agreed with the "reasonable suspicion" standard,
he believed that the court's application of it in the case at hand was
improper.28 He believed the record clearly supported a reasonable
suspicion.2 9 Justice Mosk believed that the minor's evasiveness when
approached by the assistant principal, who was properly acting within
his supervisory role, and the juvenile's attempt to conceal the bag
gave the assistant principal reasonable suspicion. 30
V. CONCLUSION
In holding that "reasonable suspicion" was the proper test for de-
termining whether a search by a public school official of a minor stu-
dent is legal, the supreme court merely adhered to the current
federal standard. In holding that a reasonable suspicion did not exist
in this case, the supreme court has, in effect, restricted the ability of
public school officials to conduct searches of students. It is clear that
23. 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (1973).
24. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 566, 709 P.2d at 1297, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
25. Id. at 567-68, 709 P.2d at 1298, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 129. For a detailed discussion of
the exclusionary rule, see 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 1.4 - 1.11 (1978 & Supp. 1986). See also M. KRAUSE, CALIFOR-
NIA SEARCH & SEIZURE PRACTICE §§ 1.4-1.7 (2d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1985).
26. William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 568, 709 P.2d at 1298, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring & dissenting).
27. Id. at 570, 709 P.2d at 1300, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
28. Id. at 570, 709 P.2d at 1300, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 131 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 573-74, 709 P.2d at 1302, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
1124
[Vol. 13: 1101, 1986] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the court will not allow just any "suspicion" to justify a warrantless
search. How much more that will be required to give rise to a "rea-
sonable suspicion" will have to be determined by subsequent judicial
interpretations.
JAMES G. BOHM
C. An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
from warrantless aerial searches of his properly
enclosed backyard: People v. Cook.
In People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710 P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499
(1985), the supreme court was called upon to define the controversial
contours of the reasonable expectation of privacy aspects of article I,
section 13 of the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
The court held that an individual possesses a reasonable expectation
of privacy from purposeful police surveillance of his enclosed back-
yard from the air. The court's rationale was that no societal or law
enforcement interest is strong enough to justify even aerial police in-
trusions into such a private area of one's property.
Appellant had been convicted of unlawfully cultivating marijuana
in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11358. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 1977). The appellant moved
to suppress the evidence of marijuana on the ground that the war-
rant under which the marijuana was discovered had been obtained as
a result of Ea unlawful aerial search.
In reversing appellant's conviction, the court first examined the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard established by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The court noted that the appropri-
ate inquiry is whether the government unreasonably intruded on an
expectation of privacy which society would recognize as valid. People
v. Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98, 679 P.2d 62, 201 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1984).
The court recognized that a valid privacy interest exists in the
"curtilage" of a private residence. The court defined "curtilage" as
the zone immediately surrounding the home in which private exte-
rior life cart be expected to extend. The appellant's backyard was
thus included within this definition. While the court acknowledged
that the recent United States Supreme Court case of Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), had held valid a warrantless aerial search
of an open field, it emphasized that the Oliver holding was not appli-
cable to curtilage areas. Id. at 180.
The court rejected the People's argument that the plain view doc-
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trine was applicable. The People contended that because the area
above appellant's backyard was open to routine observation from any
passing air flight, it was in plain view. Appellant could therefore
have no reasonable expectation of privacy as to his yard. The court
disagreed, stating that regardless of whether the yard was within the
public view, the constitution still shields landowners from govern-
ment intrusions where subjective and legitimate privacy expectations
exist.
The court found that the appellant did in fact maintain a legitimate
and subjective expectation of privacy as evidenced by his efforts to
prevent observation. Appellant had installed a high wooden fence
around his land. This action was held to be a sufficient privacy-seek-
ing measure in light of the fact that persons could not reasonably be
expected to totally enclose their property in order to prevent aerial
surveillance by government agents. The court rejected the implica-
tion that rights derived from the constitution diminish as the govern-
ment acquires new technological means of infringing upon such
rights.
After analyzing several California cases which had allowed war-
rantless aerial searches of rural areas at reasonable heights, and rec-
ognizing that citizens do not have the right to expect privacy in the
conduct of criminal affairs per se, the court found that these cases
and arguments were not specifically applicable to the facts in Cook.
Instead, the court compared Cook to United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984), and found the latter case's holding and rationale to be ap-
plicable. In Karo, the court stated that the indiscriminate monitoring
of property which has been withdrawn from public view would pres-
ent far too serious a threat to the privacy interests of the home to
escape constitutional oversight. Id. at 707. The court in Cook adopted
this reasoning and applied it to the appellant's backyard situation.
Thus, the warrantless aerial scrutiny of appellant's backyard, for
the sole purpose of detecting criminal activity by the occupants of the
property, was held unconstitutional. Nevertheless, this case still
leaves open the possibility that "inadvertant" aerial discoveries which
are not part of a specific search may still be used as evidence against
defendants. Since this avenue was left open to the police, they may
find it a tempting method to circumvent the Cook ruling.
CHRISTIE A. MOON
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V. DEATH PENALTY
A. Failure to instruct the jury that they must find a
specific intent to kill before they can find the special
circumstance of murder while engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery to be
true requires reversal of the death penalty: People v.
13alderas.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Balderas,1 the defendant was prosecuted in a single
trial for sixteen felonies arising from three separate incidents. For
the first incident, the defendant was convicted of two counts each of
forcible kidnapping and robbery and one count each of forcible rape,
oral copulation, and sodomy. The jury further found that the defend-
ant had used a firearm as to each count. For the second incident, the
defendant was convicted of kidnapping for the purposes of robbery,
first degree murder, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Under
the 1978 death penalty law, the jury found true a charged special cir-
cumstance that the defendant committed the murder while engaged
in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery.2 With re-
gard to the third incident, the defendant was convicted of two counts
each of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and false im-
prisonment. The jury assessed the death penalty for the murder spe-
cial circumstance. On appeal, the supreme court upheld the guilty
verdict, but reversed the death penalty because the jury was not in-
structed that the special circumstance requires a finding of a specific
intent to kilL.3
The first incident occurred on Christmas Eve, 1979. Sometime af-
ter midnight, the defendant approached a couple, Randy and Corrine,
who were in a parked car. He put a gun to Randy's head and ordered
him to drive as directed.4 During their drive, the defendant de-
manded that Corrine remove her clothes. He then ordered her to get
in the back seat where he forced her to engage in oral copulation and
1. 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985). The opinion was written
by Justice Grodin, with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, and Kaus concurring. Chief Jus-
tice Bird, Justice Lucas, and Justice Mosk each wrote separate concurring and dissent-
ing opinions. Justice Kaus was assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 161, 711 P.2d at 485-86, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
3. Id. at 162, 711 P.2d at 486, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 190. See also People v. Garcia, 36
Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1229 (1985);
Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
4. Balderm, 41 Cal. 3d at 163, 711 P.2d at 487, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
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he raped her.5 This was repeated several times. The defendant then
ordered Randy to take off his clothes and to get out of the car.6 The
defendant drove with Corrine in the car and eventually stopped in an
isolated area where he forced her to engage in oral copulation and he
sodomized her.7
The next incident happened later that morning. The defendant ap-
proached a man in a parked pickup truck. Using a sawed-off shot-
gun, the defendant got in the truck where he subsequently robbed
and murdered the man. The victim's nude body was found on Christ-
mas morning. He had been shot in the left leg and pelvis.8
The third incident occurred on August 20, 1980, when the defend-
ant escaped from custody. The defendant overpowered a deputy
sheriff and, with the assistance of another prisoner, tied and bound
the officer.9 After unsuccessfully trying to leave through the ceiling
vents, the defendant and the other inmate took a sheriff's aide hos-
tage and stole his keys.1O
The defendant's sole defense was that of diminished capacity as to
the specific intent crimes." There was evidence that the defendant
was a chronic drug abuser, regularly using both PCP and "crank."12
The defense expert testified that in his opinion the defendant would
not have committed the crimes had he not been under the influence
of drugs.13 An expert for the prosecution testified that the defend-
ant's capacity to form the specific intent had not been diminished by
drug use.14
5. Id.
6. Id. at 163-64, 711 P.2d at 487, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
7. Id. at 164, 711 P.2d at 487, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
8. Id. at 165-66, 711 P.2d at 488, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
9. Id. at 167, 711 P.2d at 489, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
1o. Id.
11. Id. These included the robberies of the three victims, the kidnapping of the
man in the parked pickup truck for the purposes of robbery, and first degree felony
murder based on the commission of a robbery. Id.
12. Id. at 167, 711 P.2d at 490, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
13. Id. at 167-68, 711 P.2d at 490, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
14. Id. at 166, 711 P.2d at 489, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 193. Capacity to form a specific
intent is no longer relevant in California because the inability to form a specific intent
is not a defense. The only question for consideration is whether the defendant in fact
formed that specific intent. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 28 (West Supp. 1986). See also
Morse & Cohen, Diminishing Diminished Capacity in California, 2 CAL. LAW. 24
(1982); Comment, Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony in the Guilt Phase of Bifur-
cated Trials: What's Left After the Reforms of the Diminished Capacity Defense?, 16
PAC. L.J. 305 (1984).
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II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Pretrial Issues
1. Severamces and Consolidation of Trial
The defendant contended that the trial court erroneously denied
his motion to sever the trial of the crimes against Randy and Corrine
from those committed against the man in the parked pickup truck.
1 5
The defense conceded that charges of the same class may be properly
joined. 1 6 The court, in rejecting the defendant's contention, stated
that the crimes shared "'common element[s] of substantial impor-
tance.' "17 Acknowledging that even where joinder is permitted the
trial court has the discretion to sever counts "in the interest of jus-
tice,"1s the court held that the burden is on the defendant to show
an abuse of discretion by a clear showing of prejudice.19
In holding: that the defendant failed to meet his burden, the court
applied the -test articulated in Williams v. Superior Court.20 Under
Williams, the first step is to determine whether the evidence admit-
ted in the joined trial would have been admissible in separate trials.21
The court held it would have been admissible in separate trials.22
The next step is to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial
effect of the admission of evidence of the other crimes. 23 In this case,
the court held that the defendant was not unduly prejudiced because
the beneficial effects outweighed the potential prejudice.2 4
15. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 170, 711 P.2d at 491, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
16. Id. at 170-71, 711 P.2d at 491-92, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 195-96. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 954 (West 1985). See also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 294-299
(1963 & Supp. 1985).
17. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 171, 711 P.2d at 492, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (quoting Peo-
ple v. Matson, 13 Cal. 3d 35, 39, 528 P.2d 752, 754, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 666 (1974) (quoting
People v. Polk, 61 Cal. 2d 217, 230, 390 P.2d 641, 648-49, 37 Cal. Rptr. 753, 760-61
(1964)).
18. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 171, 711 P.2d at 492, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
19. Id.
20. 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d 699, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984).
21. Balders, 41 Cal. 3d at 172, 711 P.2d at 493, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
22. Id. at 173, 711 P.2d at 493. 222 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
23. Id. The defendant could be prejudiced where: evidence would not be cross-ad-
missible; certain charges would be unusually likely to inflame the jury; a weak case
has been joined with a strong case; and any one of the charges carries the death pen-
alty. Id. at 173, 711 P.2d at 494, 222 Cal. Rptr. 197-98. See also Williams v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d 699, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984); Coleman v. Superior
Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 129, 172 Cal. Rptr. 86, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981).
24. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 711 P.2d at 494-95, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
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2. Venue
The defendant also argued that he was prejudiced because his mo-
tion for change of venue was denied.25 In articulating the standard
for a change of venue, the court held that "[a] change of venue must
be granted when the defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that a
fair trial cannot be had in the original county."26 The court listed
five factors that are used to make this determination: "the gravity
and nature of the crime, the extent and nature of publicity, the size
and nature of the community, the status of the victim, and the status
of the accused."27 Based on these factors, the court determined that
the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he
could not obtain a fair trial.28
3. Double Jeopardy
The defense's final pretrial contention was that the defendant was
placed in double jeopardy. On August 13, 1980, a jury was empaneled
and witnesses were sworn. The next day, a juror informed the court
that an investigator for the district attorney's office had telephoned
his wife to inquire about his views on the death penalty. The trial
judge, upon learning of this, declared a mistrial.29 In holding that the
defendant waived any double jeopardy claim, the court noted that he
consented to the mistrial. 30
B. Jury Selection Issues
The defendant also raised several jury selection issues. First, he
argued that he was improperly restricted in his voir dire of the jury
panel.31 The trial court did not allow the defense counsel to question
jurors about their ability to apply instructions on the legal theories of
circumstantial evidence and diminished capacity. 32 In holding that
there was neither error nor prejudice, the court stated that the de-
fense counsel's prohibited questions related only to possible peremp-
tory challenges.33
Second, the defendant contended that the court, in questioning the
jury, made them unduly prone to find guilt and impose a penalty of
25. Id. at 177, 711 P.2d at 496, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 177-78, 711 P.2d at 496, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
28. Id. at 178, 711 P.2d at 497, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
29. Id. at 181-82, 711 P.2d at 499, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
30. Id. at 182, 711 P.2d at 500, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 182-83, 711 P.2d at 500, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 204. But see People v. Love, 53
Cal. 2d 843, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960).
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death.34 The trial court, during the process of death qualification,
asked each individual panel member five questions regarding the
death penalty.35 The court, unpersuaded by the defendant's argu-
ment, stated that the "questions were reasonable attempts to isolate
jurors excludable for cause because of their absolute bias for or
against the death penalty."36
Third, the defendant contended that exclusion of jurors who said
they could not vote for the death penalty denied him a representative
jury.3 7 The court easily disposed of this contention, merely stating
that the defendant lacked standing. Even if he had standing, the
court acknowledged that that type of contention has been consist-
ently rejected. 38
C. Guilt and Special Circumstance Issues
First, the defendant contended that he was improperly restricted
on cross-examination. In order to impeach one of the prosecution's
chief witnesses, the defendant wanted to ask questions regarding the
witness's habitual narcotics usage.39 In holding that the cross-exami-
nation was properly limited, the court held that evidence of habitual
drug use is not admissible to impeach the memory or perception of a
witness unless there is expert testimony on the probable effect of
that drug use on memory and perception. 40
Second, the defendant contended that the prosecutor improperly
argued that its chief witness was not an accomplice.41 The court
34. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 188, 711 P.2d at 504, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
35. Id. The questions were as follows:
(1) Would you automatically refuse to impose the death penalty regardless
of the evidence or law in the case? (2) If defendant were found guilty of
first degree raurder with special circumstances at the guilt phase, would you
automatically vote to impose the death penalty without regard to the evidence
or the law? (3) Would your death penalty views prevent you from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt? (4) Are your views such that
you would never impose the death penalty? (5) Are your views such that you
would refuse to consider imposing the death penalty in this case?
Id. (emphasis in original).
36. Id. (emphasis in original). See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
37. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 191, 711 P.2d at 506, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
38. Id. See People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1980).
39. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 192, 711 P.2d at 506-07, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
40. Id. at 192, 711 P.2d at 507, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 211. See People v. Pargo, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 594, 50 Cad. Rptr. 719 (1966). See also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1228
(2d ed. 1966); Comment, Narcotics as Affecting Credibility, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 333
(1943).
41. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 194, 711 P.2d at 508, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
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noted that the witness assisted the defendant in disposing of evi-
dence, and at most, that would make him an accessory after the
fact.42 Since the witness did not assist the defendant in the commis-
sion of the crimes, he was not an accomplice.43
Third, the defendant contended that the trial court improperly ad-
mitted evidence of his refusal to give blood and pubic hair samples.
The defendant, on advice of counsel, refused to give the samples be-
cause the demand was "untimely."44 The court held that this
presented no reversible error as there was overwhelming evidence
that the defendant committed the sex crimes.45
Fourth, the defendant contended that the jury instruction on invol-
untary manslaughter was improper because it included only the ver-
sion based on diminished capacity and did not make reference to a
killing done in the heat of passion.46 The court, in rejecting this con-
tention, held that "'predictable conduct by a resisting victim' of a fel-
ony cannot 'constitute the kind of provocation sufficient to reduce a
murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. . . ., 47
Fifth, the defendant contended that there was reversible error as
to his conviction of first degree murder because the jury was not in-
structed that it was necessary to find a specific intent to kill.48 The
jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and found
true a special circumstance that the murder occurred while the de-
fendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a
robbery.49 Insofar as the defendant's first degree murder conviction
was concerned, the court held that it did not matter whether the kill-
ing was intentional so long as it occurred during the commission of a
robbery.o But insofar as the death penalty was concerned, the court
held that failure to instruct the jury that it must find a specific intent
to kill was reversible error.51
In conclusion, the court upheld the judgment of guilt as to all
counts. Insofar as the death penalty was concerned, the court re-
versed the judgment because the jury was not instructed that it must
find a specific intent to kill before it could find true the special cir-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 194-95, 711 P.2d at 508, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
44. Id. at 195-96, 711 P.2d at 508-09, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
45. Id. at 196, 711 P.2d at 509, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
46. Id. at 196-97, 711 P.2d at 510, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
47. Id. at 197, 711 P.2d at 510, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (quoting People v. Jackson, 28
Cal. 3d 264, 306, 618 P.2d 149, 169-70, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 623-24 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1035 (1981)).
48. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 198, 711 P.2d at 511, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
49. Id.
50. Id. See People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
51. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 198, 711 P.2d at 511, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 215. See also Car-
los v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
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cumstance of first degree murder while engaged in robbery. The case
was then remanded to the lower court.
III. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Lucas authored a concurring and dissenting opinion. He
agreed with the defendant's conviction of guilt as to all counts, but
disagreed with the court's holding regarding the voir dire of the
jury.5 2 He did not believe the trial court should permit an inquiry
into specific legal prejudices of prospective jurors.53 The Justice be-
lieved that this will create unnecessary delay in the trial which may
jeopardize the trial system itself.5 4 Justice Lucas further dissented
with the reversal of the death penalty.55
Justice Mosk also wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. He
concurred insofar as the guilt of the defendant was concerned, but
dissented as to the setting aside of the special circumstance finding
and reversal of the death penalty.56 He believed that the requisite in-
tent to kill was sufficiently shown.57
Chief Justice Bird wrote a brief concurring and dissenting opinion.
She concurred with the setting aside of the special circumstance find-
ing and reversal of the death penalty.58 She did not join in the re-
mainder of the majority's opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
This case is another example of the current California Supreme
Court's refusal to enforce the death penalty law. It appears that the
court is taking an "ideological position against capital punishment,
not merely against its implementation in specific cases."59 On De-
cember 31, 1985, a day being termed the "New Year's Eve Massacre,"
eleven death penalty convictions, including this case, were reversed.60
52. Balderaw, 41 Cal. 3d at 206, 711 P.2d at 517, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 207, 711 P.2d at 517, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
55. Id. at 208, 711 P.2d at 518, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
56. Id. at 209, 711 P.2d at 518-19, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
57. Id. at 209, 711 P.2d at 519, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
58. Id. at 21L0, 711 P.2d at 519, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (Bird, C.J., concurring &
dissenting).
59. Leland, What's At Stake, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1985, at 35, 35.
60. The Beard, PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF, Winter 1986, at 23.
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Whether a systematic reversal of the death penalty will continue to
be the case in California will largely be determined by the voters.
This November every Supreme Court Justice except Broussard will
be facing a retention election. The California District Attorneys As-
sociation's Board of Directors have urged voters to reject Chief Jus-
tice Bird and Associate Justices Reynoso and Grodin.6 i
JAMES G. BOHM
B. Trial court in penalty phase of murder trial
committed reversible error by instructing the jury not
to be swayed by any sympathy for the defendant in
determining the appropriate penalty: People v. Brown.
In People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637
(1985), the supreme court ruled that a jury may take sympathy into
account in the penalty phase of a murder trial. The court also held
that the 1978 death penalty initiative law did not constitutionally re-
strict the sentencing discretion vested in the jury by requiring the
death penalty where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.
After upholding defendant's conviction on evidentiary grounds, the
court reversed the verdict of death. The reversal was based upon the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. Any jury in-
struction "which denies a capital defendant the right to have the jury
consider any 'sympathy factor' raised by the evidence when deter-
mining the appropriate penalty" is forbidden. People v. Lanphear, 36
Cal. 3d 163, 165, 680 P.2d 1081, 1082, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122, 123 (1983).
See also People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 856, 875-80, 671 P.2d 813, 823-26,
196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 319-22 (1983). Because the jury had been told only
to consider matters relating to the crime itself and to ignore* sympa-
thy, the court vacated the death penalty judgment.
Despite this finding the court then proceeded to rule on the consti-
tutionality of the 1978 death penalty initiative law. The court found
that sections 190 to 190.5 of the Penal Code did not take away the
jury's sentencing discretion by mandating the death penalty where
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp. 1986). The jury alone
still decides the appropriate penalty by weighing all relevant consti-
tutional factors.
The Brown decision may spell almost certain reversal for about 170
other pending death penalty judgments in which trial courts adminis-
tered similar jury instructions. Perhaps the gratuitous discussion up-
holding the death penalty statute's constitutionality was spawned by
a desire to placate pro-death penalty forces, and cool down the hot
61. Leland, supra note 59, at 35.
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potato that the death penalty issue has become to a court facing re-
election problems. Regardless of any intended political implications,
the constitutionality ruling is virtually immune to United States
Supreme Court review because the court reversed the penalty of
death. Brown marked the court's first blanket constitutional ap-
proval of the death penalty initiative since its passage in 1978. See
Carrizosa, Death Penalty Law Survives Last Test Before High Court,
L.A. Daily J., Dec. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
The Brown decision was stayed by Justice Rehnquist of the United
States Supreme Court on March 27, 1986.
MICHAEL R. GRADISHER
C. Jury instructions which omit the element of intent
from the offense of aiding and abetting a robbery
require not only reversal of the robbery conviction,
but also reversal of first degree murder and attempted
murder convictions based on the felony murder rule:
People v. Croy.
In People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1, 710 P.2d 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1985), the supreme court held that absent proof that the jury found
specific elements of certain crimes to be present, the convictions of
defendant Croy must be reversed and subject to retrial. Since the
court could not be sure that the jury found intent to aid and abet in a
robbery, Croy's conviction for that charge could not be upheld.
Therefore, the court held that the murder and attempted murder
convictions could not stand under the felony murder rule. The judg-
ment was also erroneous because the court could not say that the
jury had found malice. Malice requires knowledge of a duty, and in
his diminished capacity, Croy may not have been able to comprehend
his duty to protect human life.
Patrick Croy was a twenty-three year old logging camp worker
who spent the weekend of July 14, 1978, consuming excessive quanti-
ties of alcohol and drugs with his friends. On Sunday night at ap-
proximately 10:30 p.m., he had a heated confrontation with police
officers responding to a neighbor's complaints about the party. Wit-
nesses, both at the party and in the neighborhood, testified that this
group of "friends" discussed tearing up the town and shooting the
sheriff. Croy went to his girlfriend's house and got his rifle. Aware
of his intoxicated state, she pretended not to be able to find any
bullets.
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Croy and his friends proceeded to a local liquor store where earlier
that night he and the clerk had argued over change from a liquor
purchase. Another argument occurred resulting in a scuffle in which
one of Croy's friends tried to stab the clerk, who ran out of the store
screaming for help. When a squad car appeared, Croy sped away
with his friends in the car. After a chase by multiple squad cars, a
shootout resulted, injuring Croy and one officer, and leaving another
officer dead. Ballistics tests confirmed that the bullet which killed
the officer was not only stolen from the liquor store during the con-
frontation with the clerk, but that it had been fired from Croy's rifle.
Croy was convicted of five separate offenses in connection with the
events of that night. The supreme court upheld his convictions for
assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon and conspiracy to
commit murder. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 245(b), 182 (West Supp. 1986).
The court reversed and ordered a retrial for the other three charges
- robbery, attempted murder, and first degree murder - because it
found that the erroneous jury instructions made it unclear as to
whether the jury had properly considered all the elements of those
three crimes. Id. §§ 211, 664, 187, 189.
Both the United States and California Supreme Courts have held
that it is prejudicial error to fail to instruct a jury on the elements of
an offense. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983); People v. Gar-
cia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1229 (1985). The court determined that the jury instruction
used in this case to determine if Croy aided and abetted in a robbery
required only knowledge and encouragement of the criminal act.
However, the court had recently decided that an appropriate instruc-
tion on aiding and abetting should require the jury to find the de-
fendant acted with: 1) "knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator; and 2) the intent or purpose of committing, encourag-
ing, or facilitating the commision of the offense, 3) by act or advice
aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates, the commission of the
crime." People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 561, 674 P.2d 1318, 1326, 199
Cal. Rptr. 60, 68-69 (1984) (emphasis added).
The Beeman decision applies to all cases not yet finally resolved.
Therefore, the court determined that Croy could not be convicted of
the robbery unless it could be shown that he intended to either com-
mit the crime or have someone else steal the bullets. The court could
find no evidence that Croy even knew that the bullets were going to
be stolen from the liquor store, or that he himself intended to com-
mit any criminal act in the store. The majority felt that his explana-
tion of fleeing the scene because he was afraid his probation would be
revoked for being drunk was legitimate.
Because Croy was convicted under the special circumstance of com-
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mitting a murder in the course of a robbery, he contended that rever-
sal of the robbery conviction also necessitated reversal of the first
degree and attempted murder convictions. Under the felony-murder
rule, if there is not an independent felony, like robbery, the special
circumstance condition will fail. Croy could then have been con-
victed of the murder charges only by a showing of malice. Since the
court did not find all of the elements of malice, it reversed the mur-
der convictions.
The requisite state of mind necessary to convict for first degree
murder requires a showing that a defendant acted with malice afore-
thought. Distinct from willful, deliberate, and premeditated action,
malice requires wanton disregard for human life. People v. Conley,
64 Cal. 2d 31.0, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). "An intentional
act that is highly dangerous to human life, done in disregard of the
actor's awareness that society requires him to conform his conduct to
the law, is done with malice. . . ." Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 822. See also People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 759, 518 P.2d
342, 351, 11 Cal. Rptr. 910, 919 (1974).
The court found that because Croy was probably intoxicated during
the night's events, his diminished capacity would have made it diffi-
cult for him to comprehend the duty of preservation of human life.
Since it was unclear whether the jury considered all the elements to
find malice aforethought, the court overturned the decision and re-
manded the case for retrial.
CYNTHIA A. WALKER
D. Penal Code section 190.2(a)(18)'s special circumstance
of torture requires the commitment of an intentional
act calculated to cause extreme physical pain prior to
death: People v. Davenport.
In People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794 (1985), the supreme court held that proof of murder with the spe-
cial circumstance of torture pursuant to Penal Code section
190.2(a)(18) requires a finding of intent to cause extreme physical
pain in the victim before death. Furthermore, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that section 190.2(a)(18) required the prosecu-
tion to prove that the victim actually suffered extreme pain.
Section 190.2(a)(18) defines torture as "the infliction of extreme
physical pain no matter how long its duration." CAL PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(18) (West Supp. 1986). Although the statute does not ex-
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pressly require the prosecution to prove intent to torture, the court
reasoned that the well-established meaning of "torture" necessarily
includes an element of scienter. The inquiry must focus on "the state
of mind of the torturer - the cold-blooded intent to inflict pain for
personal gain or satisfaction. . . ." People v. Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162,
173, 554 P.2d 881, 887, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 141 (1976). The court fur-
ther noted that proof of pain subjectively felt by the victim would be
impossible to prove. Interpreting section 190.2(a)(18) to require such
proof would also raise constitutional questions about the validity of
torture as a special circumstance. The court held where a statute
could possibly be construed as being constitutional, the court has a
duty to construe it as such. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131,
147-48, 672 P.2d 862, 873, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 90-91 (1983).
The court also vacated the defendant's death sentence, citing nu-
merous penalty phase errors. Of particular interest was the prosecu-
tor's prejudicial remarks made in the penalty phase closing
argument. The prosecutor referred to the governor's power to com-
mute any death penalty sentence to a sentence of life without parole,
despite the trial court's ruling that the jury could not be so in-
structed. The court noted this reference was just as prejudicial as the
jury instruction would have been because it invited the jury to specu-
late on improper considerations. See People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136,
153, 689 P.2d 430, 439-40, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809-10 (1984).
MICHAEL R. GRADISHER
E. Defense counsel's failure to present mitigating
evidence during the penalty phase resulted in a
miscarriage of justice causing reversal of death
penalty: People v. Deere.
In People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1985), the supreme court found that defense counsel had an affirma-
tive duty to present mitigating evidence in the penalty determination
for a capital offense. Imposition of the death penalty was a miscar-
riage of justice because of defense counsel's failure to present any
mitigating evidence, notwithstanding the defendant's wish to the
contrary.
The defendant, Ronald Lee Deere, pleaded guilty and was con-
victed of one count of first degree murder and two counts of second
degree murder, together with a finding of a multiple-murder special
circumstance. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
The defendant had admittedly shot and killed an old girlfriend's sis-
ter's husband and two children, evidently because she had terminated
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their relationship. The appeal to the supreme court was automatic
from the imposition of the death sentence.
The court held that the trial court did not err by failing to hold a
competency hearing to determine whether defendant was competent
to plead guilty and waive his right to a jury in the penalty phase.
The court reasoned that the trial court did not have a duty to order a
competency hearing sua sponte because it had previously appointed a
psychiatrist who had found that the defendant was competent to un-
derstand the rights he had waived. The court also held that defense
counsel's assistance was not ineffective because he allowed the de-
fendant to waive his penalty phase jury. The court reasoned that de-
fense counsel's consent seemed to be motivated by good tactical
notions and not solely out of a desire to expedite defendant's "death
wish."
The court, however, found that defense counsel's failure to offer
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was a miscarriage of justice
which required the sentence of death to be set aside. See 22 Cal. Jur.
3d Criminal Law § 3346 (1985). The court concluded that the State
of California could not be forced by someone to use all its means to
take that person's life. Despite defendant's desire to die for atone-
ment of his murders, strong public policy cannot condone a state-
aided suicide. The court referred to a similar case where the defend-
ant wished to dismiss his automatic appeal of the death sentence. See
People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1969). Stanworth's attempt to waive his appeal was rejected by the
court because of its well-defined duty to determine whether the de-
fendant has had a fair trial by looking at the entire record on appeal.
The court reasoned that the automatic appeal from the death sen-
tence and the requirement to present mitigating evidence are rules
established by public policy and could not be circumvented by a de-
fendant's personal desire to the contrary. The court also mentioned
the strong public interest in capital cases of taking every precaution
against mistaken judgments.
The court held that the defendant was deprived of effective assist-
ance of counsel by defense counsel's failure to call witnesses who
could present mitigating evidence on behalf of defendant during the
penalty phase. The attorney had a duty to control the proceedings
and call the witnesses, fulfilling his duty to present a case in mitiga-
tion to assure reliability in the penalty determination, and also to at-
tempt to convince the sentencer that defendant should not die in
spite of his guilt.
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The defense counsel conceded that members of the defendant's
family wanted to testify on his behalf to present evidence of his good
character and give reasons defendant should live. Thus, the defend-
ant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because no at-
tempt was made to call witnesses on his behalf. Therefore, the
imposition of the death sentence was a miscarriage of justice requir-
ing reversal. The sentence was affirmed in all other aspects.
MARIE P. HENWOOD
F. Failure to give explicit instructions to the jury that it
must find an intent to kill in a felony murder special
circumstance case constitutes reversible error in
penalty phase: People v. Fuentes.
In People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629, 710 P.2d 240, 221 Cal. Rptr. 440
(1985), the supreme court held that a special circumstance finding
must be reversed absent explicit instructions to the jury that it find
an intent to kill. Since there must be a specific finding of intent to
kill to support a conviction of a felony murder special circumstance,
the court's failure to give those instructions constituted reversible er-
ror. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment as to guilt but re-
versed the judgment imposing the death penalty.
During an attempted robbery of a Brinks guard by the appellant
and an accomplice, the guard was fatally shot. The appellant was
charged with first degree murder with the special circumstance that
the murder was committed during the attempted commission of a
robbery. During voir dire, the trial court precluded defense counsel
from questioning prospective jurors as to whether they believed a
robbery accomplice who does not kill should be punished as severely
as an intentional killer. At the conclusion of the trial, the court did
not explicitly instruct the jury that it had to find an intent to kill if it
believed the defendant was the actual killer.
In Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 79 (1983), the court held that there must be a specific finding of
intent to kill to support a felony murder special circumstance finding
pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17). Although the statutory
language may be unclear, the court in Carlos held that such intent is
an essential element. Thus, the supreme court concluded that the
trial court's failure to explicitly instruct the jury that it had to find
an intent to kill if it believed that appellant was the actual killer was
error under Carlos.
The court stated that this error requires reversal unless one of the
four narrow exceptions set forth in People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539,
684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984), apply. The court analyzed the
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Cantrell-Thornton exception as it was the only exception applicable.
See People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 523 P.2d 267, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975); People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d
672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973). Pursuant to this excep-
tion, Carlos error does not require reversal if the parties recognized
that intent to kill was in issue and if the record clearly establishes
this intent. However, the record failed to establish that the parties
recognized that an intent to kill was in issue. Since there was a dis-
pute as to who fired the actual shot, defense counsel concentrated on
raising a reasonable doubt as to who did the actual shooting. The ap-
pellant's intent to kill was never raised as an issue because the trial
occurred prior to the Carlos decision. Therefore, the exception was
not applicable and the special circumstance finding was reversed.
The court's reversal of the special circumstance finding eliminated
the need to determine whether the restriction of defense counsel's
voir dire questioning provided an independent ground for reversal.
However, the court did conclude that defense counsel's questions
should have been permitted on the grounds that they incorporated a
legal doctrine which appeared to be relevant to the special circum-
stance and the penalty provision. The court held that reasonable in-
quiries regarding a potential juror's willingness to apply a particular
doctrine of law must be allowed if counsel is to effectively exercise
his peremptory challenges.
TAMI J. TAECKER
G. Failure to prove intent requires reversal of death
penalty conviction under special circumstances:
People v. Hamilton.
In People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 211, 710 P.2d 937, 221 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1985), the supreme court held that failure to instruct the jury
that intent to kill is a necessary element of a special circumstances
conviction requires reversal of the death penalty judgment. How-
ever, the petitioner's rights were not violated by: 1) a second booking
search of his belongings; 2) the court's refusal to recuse the district
attorney's office; and 3) the prosecution's arrest and subsequent
granting of immunity to the defendant's witness who then proceeded
to testify for the prosecution.
Hamilton, the petitioner, had entered Fran's Market in Fresno
armed with a sawed-off shotgun. After forcing employees into a back
room, he ordered one by name to show him where the safe was lo-
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cated. He then shot three of the employees at close range. A fourth
employee and a neighbor were wounded. Hamilton was arrested six
days later in Modesto after a second robbery. Following his transfer
to Fresno, a second booking search uncovered a slip of paper contain-
ing the name of Fran's Market and that of one of the victims. From
this evidence the prosecution theorized that Hamilton committed the
murders in retaliation for the burglary conviction of former fellow
inmate Clarence Allen. Allen had been serving time at Folsom for
his burglary of Fran's Market at the time Hamilton was released in
1980.
Hamilton was convicted of three counts of first degree murder,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 189 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986), one count of
attempted robbery, id. §§ 211, 664, two counts of assault with a deadly
weapon, id. § 245(a), and was sentenced to death, id. § 190.1-190.4.
Special circumstances were found for each of the three murder
counts. There were two multiple murder findings based on the other
two murder verdicts, and one finding that the murder was committed
in the course of an attempted robbery. See id. §§ 190.2(a)(3);
(a)(17)(i).
Although the defendant objected to the search that uncovered his
"hit list," the court held that the second search was proper in con-
junction with the second booking at the second jail. The officer in
Fresno was merely fulfilling his statutory duty to search for valu-
ables or items detrimental to jail security. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26640
(West 1968 & Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1412, 4003 (West 1982
& Supp. 1986).
The court also denied the defendant's motion to recuse the district
attorney's office whose members, while in private practice, had de-
fended Clarence Allen in his burglary charge of Fran's Market. The
court noted that a recusal motion need not be granted unless the con-
flict of interest indicates that the defendant is unlikely to obtain a
fair trial. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1424 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). Since
the court found no evidence of a conflict of interest, it held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the recusal motion.
See Chadwick v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 108, 164 Cal. Rptr.
864 (1980).
Hamilton also objected to the coercion of his prime guilt phase wit-
ness, Callaway. After Callaway had testified favorably for the de-
fense, he was arrested on outstanding misdemeanor warrants. After
being promised immunity from prosecution for perjury, Callaway re-
canted his testimony and instead testified for the prosecution.
Although courts have concluded that judicial coercion leading to a re-
canting is a denial of due process, the court felt it could not find that
coercion had occurred in this case due to the untimeliness of the
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charge. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972). Because Hamilton
failed to make a timely objection at the trial, and because the
supreme court did not find any actual government threat to file per-
jury charges against Callaway, the court concluded that coercion had
not occurred.
The court agreed with the defendant's claim of erroneous jury in-
structions and reversed the murder under special circumstance con-
viction. It held that its decision in Carlos was both retroactive and
applicable to this case. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672
P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983). Under Carlos, a jury must find in-
tent to kill in order to find a defendant guilty under special circum-
stances. Although the dissent clearly found an intent to kill by the
meticulous reloading of the shotgun and the firing at point blank
range, the majority reasoned that Hamilton's diminished capacity due
to drug use may have hampered his intent-forming ability. There-
fore, the judgment of death was reversed.
CYNTHIA M. WALKER
H. Conviction of felony murder special circumstances
must be supported by a specific finding of intent to
kill: People v. Hamilton.
In People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 408, 710 P.2d 981, 221 Cal. Rptr.
902 (1985), the supreme court held that the trial court's special cir-
cumstance finding should be reversed absent explicit instructions to
the jury that it had to find an intent to kill. The court's failure to
give these instructions constituted reversible error because a convic-
tion of feloLy murder special circumstances must be supported by a
specific finding of intent to kill. Therefore, the court affirmed the
judgment as to guilt, but reversed the judgment imposing the penalty
of death.
The victim was last seen alive while walking to her car at night in
a college parking lot. The victim's body was found the next day with
both head and hands cut off, and the ankles bound together with
white cord. After stealing the victim's vehicle, the defendant on sev-
eral occasions used the victim's credit cards to buy food and gas. The
defendant was apprehended a few days later in Oklahoma while driv-
ing the van.
A felony murder special circumstance conviction must be sup-
ported by a specific finding of intent to kill. Carlos v. Superior Court,
35 Cal. 3d 13S1, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983). Thus, the court
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concluded that the trial court's failure to explicitly instruct the jury
that it had to find an intent to kill was error under Carlos.
Carlos error is reversible unless one of the four narrow exceptions
apply as set forth in People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205
Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1229 (1985). The excep-
tion, applied where evidence establishes intent to kill as a matter of
law, was held to be inapplicable because the coroner could not deter-
mine whether the victim's head and hands were cut off before or af-
ter death. Thus, the error was reversible and necessitated reversal of
the judgment imposing the death penalty.
The defendant made three other claims of error. First, the defend-
ant argued that he was denied his constitutional right of self-repre-
sentation. In People v. Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 137 P.2d 1187, 137
Cal. Rptr. 8 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1977), the court held a
motion to proceed in propria persona does not invoke the constitu-
tional right of self-representation unless it is made within a reason-
able time before the trial begins. Since the defendant's motion was
untimely, it was within the trial court's discretion to deny the
motion.
Second, the defendant contended that the trial court's decision to
physically restrain him by shackles was unmeritorious. The court
dismissed this claim. The trial court has discretion to order physical
restraints. Thus, since the trial court properly complied with all pro-
cedural requirements and there was no abuse of discretion, the court
rejected the defendant's argument.
Finally, the defendant objected to the admission into evidence of
three letters. The court concluded that the admission of these letters
into evidence to illustrate the defendant's fear of prison constituted
error. This conclusion was premised on the theory that it required
too much speculation. However, this error was not prejudicial.
TAMI J. TAECKER
I. Failure to instruct jury regarding torture-murder
special circumstance that defendant must have
intended to inflict extreme pain is reversible error;
instructing jury not to consider sympathy for
defendant in penalty phase is reversible error: People
v. Leach.
In an automatic appeal from the death penalty, the supreme court
in People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92, 710 P.2d 893, 221 Cal. Rptr. 826
(1985), reversed the penalty while reaffirming the defendant's guilt.
Reversible error resulted in two instances: (1) the court failed to in-
struct the jury that, as an element of the torture-murder special cir-
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cumstance, defendant must have intended to inflict extreme pain;
and (2) the trial court instructed the jury not to consider any sympa-
thy for defendant in reaching its verdict.
Defendant Michael Todd Leach was convicted of the first degree
murder of Michael Messer, whose body had been found in a fig
orchard with forty eight stab wounds. Defendant was also convicted
of one count of robbery, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of
that murder and robbery, intentional murder involving the use of
torture, and murder committed during the commission of a robbery.
The trial court entered a judgment of death against defendant.
Defendant's acquaintances, who had been granted immunity, testi-
fied to the alleged drug deal that led to the ultimate robbery and
murder of Messer. After telling friends he was going to rob and kill
Messer, defendant and Patrick Jones took Messer out to an orchard
where they faked engine trouble in order to stop. The three began
throwing knives at a tree stump. When one knife disappeared and
Messer began looking for it, the two others began stabbing him nu-
merous times, ending with defendant slitting his throat. The police
arrested defendant the next day, charging him with planning and in-
stigating the robbery and murder. Defendant was convicted of the
charges brought against him.
On appeal, the court considered eleven of defendant's thirteen con-
tentions. The court gave serious consideration to only three
contentions.
One of the defendant's major contentions was that the court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on the necessity of an intent to kill in
the felony-murder special circumstance as required by Carlos v. Su-
perior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1985).
This error requires per se reversal unless one of the following four
exceptions is met:
(1) where the defendant was acquitted of the relevant charge;
(2) where the defendant conceded the issue of intent;
(3) where the jury necessarily found the requisite intent to kill as a result of
other properly given instructions (the so-called Sedeno exception); and
(4) where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all
evidence at their command on that issue, and the record not only estab-
lishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evi-
dence not worthy of consideration (the so-called Thornton-Cantrell
exception).
Leach, 41 Cal. 3d at 108, 710 P.2d at 902, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (citing
People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 554-56, 684 P.2d 826, 834-36, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 27,2-75 (1984)).
The court determined that this case fell within the Sedeno excep-
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tion because the jury necessarily found the requisite intent to kill as
a result of the instruction on the special circumstance of intentional
murder involving torture. Therefore, the court held the Sedeno ex-
ception worked to "cure" the Carlos error.
Furthermore, the court held that defendant's contention that the
court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the torture-mur-
der special circumstance was reversible error. The court failed to in-
struct the jury that the defendant must intend to inflict extreme pain
upon his victim. The court's rationale for this finding was that none
of the Garcia exceptions applied to cure this instruction. The court
suggested one possible inference from multiple stab wounds was that
the defendant had great difficulty in killing his victim.
An instruction to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial that
they should not be swayed by mere sympathy was also found to be
reversible error. Where there is evidence of mitigating factors, the
jury should be instructed that it may consider sympathy and compas-
sion in its deliberation. In this case, this was defendant's first offense
and he was only eighteen years old. The defendant was also raised
by an invalid mother, and his father had died when the defendant
was fifteen. These circumstances were mitigating, and the instruc-
tion may have precluded the jury from properly considering such fac-
tors in the penalty trial.
MARIE P. HENWOOD
J. In penalty phase of murder trial, the jury must be
instructed to consider and weigh the defendant's
mitigating evidence of character and background:
People v. Lucky.
Due to a finding of prejudice in the penalty phase of a murder
trial, the court reversed the death sentence, but sustained the guilty
verdict, in People v. Lucky, 41 Cal. 3d 315, 710 P.2d, 959, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 880 (1985). The court found an improper use of statutory jury
instructions. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1986). How-
ever, only three justices agreed upon the errors of the trial court.
The Chief Justice concurred in the judgment, and three justices dis-
sented from the decision to reverse the death penalty. Thus, that
portion of the opinion does not have the force of law. Compare Peo-
ple v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1985)
(plurality opinion for reversal of the death penalty).
Allegations of multiple counts of robbery, attempted robbery, and
two murders that occurred in a series of incidents were consolidated
into one trial. A considerable amount of evidence, including the tes-
timony of several eye witnesses, was introduced by the prosecution.
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Little evidence was offered by the defendant beyond his own testi-
mony. The jury found that the murders were premeditated and con-
victed the defendant on all counts. The jury also found special
circumstance; of multiple murder and of murder in the course of an
attempted robbery, even though there was only one incident of
murder.
A substantial amount of evidence in the penalty phase of the trial
was offered to show the defendant's long history of criminal conduct,
incarceration, and belligerence toward his parole officer. In contrast,
the defense emphasized the defendant's difficult personal back-
ground. This plea for sympathy did little to sway the jury.
None of the, challenges to the guilty conviction merited serious con-
sideration by the court. However, errors made in the penalty phase
were deemed to be of such import that the sentence of death was re-
versed. First, the trial court failed to fully instruct the jury that any
evidence of mitigating factors related to the defendant's background
and character must be carefully weighed in a death penalty case. The
supreme court relied upon the decisions of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 110.12 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-05
(1978), as authority for requiring this instruction. Error was also
found in an instruction that required the jury to reach a just verdict
regardless of what the consequences may be. Such an instruction,
designed for the guilt phase of a trial, should never be given at the
penalty phase.
Of further disturbance to the court was the allegation of two spe-
cial circumstances for one double murder. This tactic had the effect
of shifting the jury's focus away from the objective considerations of
the particular case. Only one special circumstance can be alleged sep-
arately from the multiple murder allegation itself. See People v. Har-
ris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984) (construing
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
Finally, the testimony of the defendant's parole officer was deemed
to have been improperly admitted. Instead of relating to specific acts
of misconduct, the officer gave only his opinion of the defendant's
character. Unless such testimony is probative of a specific aggravat-
ing factor, the court ruled that the prosecution may only offer evi-
dence of past acts to show the defendant's character in the case in
chief. A combination of these errors was ruled sufficient to show
prejudice that required reversal of the death penalty. Nonetheless,
the minimum sentence upon remand would have to be life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole.
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The court distinguished between the standard for harmless error in
the guilt phase of a trial versus the standard in the penalty phase
when the sentence imposed is death. Since death is profoundly dif-
ferent from all other penalties, and the jury does not function as the
fact finder in this stage, the standard of review must be different.
Any substantial error occurring during the penalty phase must be
deemed to have caused unfair prejudice.
The court again expressed a willingness to overturn the imposition
of the death penalty, even though there was a lack of agreement on
what the basis for reversal should be. Extreme care should be used
in citing this case as authority because it does not have the effect of
law. The court granted a rehearing in this case on February 20, 1986.
JAMES B. BRISTOL
K. Under Penal Code section 1018, a capital offense plea
of guilty made with reluctant consent of counsel and
in spite of counsel's best independent judgment
constitutes reversible error: People v. Massie.
In People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140
(1985), the defendant appealed a judgment imposing the death sen-
tence. At trial, defendant pled guilty and was convicted of murder
with special circumstances, assault with a deadly weapon, four counts
of possession of a concealed weapon by an ex-felon, and three counts
of robbery. The defendant appealed, placing into issue the circum-
stances under which his plea of guilty was entered and consented to
by defense counsel at trial.
Under California Penal Code section 1018, a defendant is not per-
mitted to plead guilty to a capital charge "without the consent of the
defendant's counsel." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 1985) (empha-
sis added). This section is constitutional and not violative of an ac-
cused's right of self-representation. See People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d
739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981). See also Faretta v. Cali-
fornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right of an accused to self-representa-
tion). Before trial, defendant Massie decided to change his plea from
"not guilty" to "guilty" when he was informed that the court had ac-
cepted as true damaging testimony concerning his confession. Sev-
eral times during the plea proceeding defendant's counsel made it
clear that he opposed a plea of guilty. However, the client was ada-
mant about pleading guilty. Therefore, defense counsel reluctantly
gave his formal consent to the guilty plea and the court then ac-
cepted it.
Although the attorney gave formal consent as required by statute,
the supreme court found that he had done so in error. At the time of
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trial, the supreme court had not yet clarified the requirements of sec-
tion 1018. In People v. Chadd, the court clarified the statute, and em-
phasized the legislature's statutory intent to eliminate arbitrariness
in death penalty statutes and to maximize the importance of the in-
dependent consent of counsel in capital cases. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d at
739, 621 P.2d at 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The Chadd decision re-
quired defense counsel to exercise their independent professional
judgment in capital cases and withhold consent to guilty pleas despite
their client's wishes where appropriate. At the time of the defend-
ant's trial, his defense counsel was still unaware of these guidelines.
The court dismissed the fact that Massie's attorney may have con-
sented to the plea because he feared his own dismissal. Furthermore,
it was irrelevant that he wished to protect his client's right of self-
representation, or may have given his consent because the evidence
against his client was overwhelming. The court thereupon held that
although Massie's attorney acted in accordance with his client's
wishes, his consent to the plea in violation of his best professional
judgment was reversible error. Similarly, through the same lack of
understanding for the statute, the trial court's acceptance of defend-
ant's guilty plea was also reversible error.
BRENDA L. THOMAS
L. To uphold death penalty for conviction of murder in
connection with robbery special circumstances, the
trial court must instruct the jury on intent to kill:
People v. Silbertson.
In People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal. 3d 296, 709 P.2d 1321, 221 Cal. Rptr.
152 (1985), the court reversed the death penalty conviction, but up-
held the judgment as to guilt because the trial court failed to instruct
the jury that. it must find an intent to kill. The defendant had been
charged and convicted of first degree murder and robbery special cir-
cumstances, and the court imposed the death penalty. The jury was
instructed on two theories with which it could convict the defendant
of first degree murder - premeditated murder and felony murder.
The defendant contended that the felony murder rule created an un-
constitutional presumption of malice. The supreme court was unper-
suaded and easily disposed of the issue by stating that it was settled
in People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390
(1980).
However, with regard to the special circumstance finding, the court
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held that the trial court committed reversible error, insofar as the
death penalty was concerned, when it failed to instruct the jury that
it must find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the
robbery special circumstance to be true. See generally Carlos v. Supe-
rior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
Defense counsel also argued that this was a murder with an inci-
dental robbery. The defendant made this contention because under
the reasoning of People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1980), it would preclude the death penalty. The People ar-
gued that the issue of intent was raised, the parties presented evi-
dence on the issue, and the evidence established the requisite intent
to kill as a matter of law. Therefore, the People asserted that the
case fell within the Cantrell-Thornton exception. See People v. Gar-
cia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 556, 684 P.2d 826, 835-36, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 274-75
(1984).
In rejecting the People's contention, the court stated that because
the defense counsel was unaware of the "intent to kill" element of
the felony-murder special circumstance, he may have failed to pres-
ent evidence which might have negated that element. Accordingly,
the court reversed the death penalty, but affirmed the guilt of the
defendant.
This is yet another example of the current court's unwillingness to
enforce the death penalty. On December 31, 1985, when this opinion
was rendered, ten other death penalty convictions were reversed. It
is now known as the "New Year's Eve Massacre." See The Beard,
Prosecutor's Brief, Winter 1986, at 23.
JAMES G. BOHM
M. Any substantial error in the penalty phase must be
considered to have been prejudicial in a criminal
trial involving capital punishment: People v. Walker.
In People v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169
(1985), the court affirmed the guilt conviction of the defendant but
reversed the imposition of the death penalty. Justices Reynoso and
Kaus joined in the plurality opinion, written by Justice Broussard,
,finding error in the trial court's use of jury instructions contained in
the relevant statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1986).
Chief Justice Bird concurred in this result only. Justices Mosk and
Grodin dissented from the decision to reverse the death penalty.
Therefore, the reasoning of the court in reversing the death sentence
in this case does not have the force of the law. Compare People v.
Lucky, 41 Cal. 3d 315, 710 P.2d 959, 221 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1985), reh'g
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granted, Crim. No. 22572 (Feb. 20, 1986) (reversal of the death pen-
alty in a plurality opinion).
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder, which took
place during the commission of an armed robbery. He was also found
guilty of several assaults with the intent to commit murder. Evi-
dence presented by the prosecution at trial was substantial, and in-
cluded the testimony of the assault victims. None of the issues raised
by the defense on appeal regarding the guilt trial were given serious
consideration by the court. However, the court found prejudicial er-
ror in the penalty phase of the trial and reversed the death sentence
imposed by the jury. This reversal was based on two grounds.
First, the trial court incorrectly admitted evidence of death threats
made by the defendant to the district attorney handling the case.
These threats were used by the prosecutor in the penalty phase as ag-
gravating factors against the defendant.
Reasonable notice must be given to the defendant of any evidence
to be offered which is not to prove the commission of the offense or
special circumstances subjecting him to the death penalty. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1986). The prosecutor did not notify the
defense of his intent to use the evidence of the death threats until
one month after the guilt trial had begun, and only one week before
the penalty trial. Although the evidence itself was not proper, the
defense had not been notified in a timely fashion.
The girlfriend and relatives of the defendant testified at the pen-
alty trial, vocalizing their desire that the defendant be allowed to
live. Each witness testified as to their love for him as well as kind
things he had done in his lifetime. The trial judge permitted the jury
to hear this testimony and instructed them that sympathy for the de-
fendant was a proper consideration in determining an appropriate
punishment.
On this second ground, the plurality found that the trial judge
failed to adequately instruct the jury of its duty to weigh and con-
sider the evidence of mitigating circumstances. The trial judge had
instead relied, upon the instruction in Penal Code section 190.3 to ad-
monish the jury to return the verdict of death if they concluded that
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating circumstances. The court
noted that such an instruction creates the risk that a jury will bal-
ance aggravating and mitigating factors in a mechanical fashion. See
People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 542, 709 P.2d 440, 456, 220 Cal. Rptr.
637, 653 (1985). However, the court indicated that curative instruc-
tions which properly explain to the jury its role in deciding the ap-
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propriate penalty will eliminate this type of risk. However, there
was no curative instruction given by the trial judge. This error, when
combined with the improper admission of evidence, was deemed to be
prejudicial, and thus warranted the reversal of the death penalty.
According to the plurality, prejudice is found whenever the error
in the penalty phase is substantial. See People v. Robertson, 33 Cal.
3d 21, 54, 655 P.2d 279, 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 196 (1982). "Substantial-
ity" was said to mean that there must be a consideration of any possi-
bility that the error affected the verdict. The court held that the
minimum penalty that could be imposed on remand would be life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole.
It should be noted that there is disagreement on the court as to the
correct basis for reversal of the death sentence. The definition for
"substantiality," therefore, does not have the force of law.
JAMES B. BRISTOL
VI. ELECTION LAW
Regulation prohibiting write-in voting in general
municipal elections held unconstitutional: Canaan v.
Abdelnour.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Canaan v. Abdelnour,' the supreme court held that San Diego's
regulation prohibiting write-in voting in general municipal elections
was unconstitutional. The court declared that the right to vote and
to run for public office are fundamental, and that the prohibition im-
pinged upon these rights absent sufficient justification.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In San Diego's mayoral election of 1974, nine candidates including
the incumbent mayor, qualified for the primary ballot. Prior to the
primary election but subsequent to the filing deadline, the San Diego
District Attorney filed a civil suit against the mayor alleging irregu-
larities in campaign contributions. As a result of this suit, petitioner
William Brotherton sought to become a write-in candidate for mayor
in the June primary election, and petitioner Jack Canaan sought to
cast a write-in vote for Brotherton.2
Pursuant to San Diego's Municipal Code, write-in voting was pro-
1. 40 Cal. 3d 703, 710 P.2d 268, 221 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1985). The opinion was written
by Chief Justice Bird, with Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Kaus concurring. Justice
Grodin authored a separate concurring opinion, with Justice Reynoso concurring. Jus-
tice Lucas filed a dissenting opinion.
2. Id. at 709, 710 P.2d at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
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hibited in all primary and general elections. 3 Any ballot containing
the name of any person not formally printed on the official ballot
would be counted as if the name did not appear. The petitioners filed
a petition for writ of mandate in the supreme court in May of 1984,
seeking to compel respondents to accept petitions for write-in candi-
dates and to give effect to any write-in votes that might be cast in the
general election.4 The petitioners alleged that the prohibition on
write-in voting was unconstitutional. The case was transferred to the
court of appeal, which did not render a decision prior to the primary
election.5
The incumbent mayor was one of the two candidates who qualified
in the primary election for placement on the ballot in the general
election.6 However, prior to the general election, the incumbent
mayor was indicted for several alleged felonies. 7 The petitioners con-
tinued to seek the opportunity to permit write-in voting in the gen-
eral election.8 In September of 1984, the court of appeal upheld San
Diego's prohibition on write-in voting. 9 The petitioners then ap-
3. At the time this action was brought, section 27.2205 of San Diego Municipal
Code prohibited write-in voting in all primary and general elections. San Diego
amended this section after the California Supreme Court heard oral argument. The
amended section permitted write-in candidates and write-in voting in municipal pri-
mary and special primary elections, but still prohibited write-ins in general municipal,
special general, and recall elections.
Specifically, the amended section provides that a candidate who files a nominating
petition not later than 60 days will be placed on the ballot. Write-in candidates can file
nominating papers within 14 days of the election. The candidate who receives the ma-
jority of votes in the primary election is elected; however, if no single candidate re-
ceives a majority of votes, then the two candidates receiving the most votes will be
placed on the ballot in the general election. Only those ballots cast for candidates
whose names appear on the ballot will be considered valid. SAN DIEGO MUN. CODE
§§ 27.3201-27.3211 (1985).
San Diego enacted section 27.2205 of the San Diego Municipal Code pursuant to the
California Con:stitution, which authorizes charter cities to enact regulations irrespec-
tive of the California Elections Code to provide procedures for write-in voting in all
federal, state, and local elections. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b)(3); CAL. ELEC. CODE
§§ 7300-7313, 17100-17102 (West 1985).
4. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 708-09, 710 P.2d at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 470. The follow-
ing were named as respondents: City of San Diego; Charles G. Abdelnour, city clerk in
charge of administering municipal elections; Raymond Oriz, San Diego County Regis-
trar of Voters; and all the mayoral and city attorney candidates who had qualified for
placement on the primary ballot. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 709, 710 P.2d at 270, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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pealed to the supreme court.10
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
An inherent principle of our nation's constitutional form of democ-
racy is the right to self-government. This right encompasses the
right to vote for the candidate of one's choice and the ability to dis-
place an incumbent in favor of a representative of a recently coa-
lesced majority. The federal and state governments, however, have
the power and authority to regulate certain aspects of the electoral
process. For example, many regulations have been enacted that re-
strict a candidate's access to the ballot."l These restrictions are pre-
mised on the grounds that they are necessary to reduce voter
confusion and maximize the probability that the winning candidate
will receive a majority of the popular vote.' 2
When ballot access regulations have been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds, courts have either applied an equal protection' 3 or
first amendment analysis.14 Traditionally, courts have applied an
equal protection analysis. Yet a clear formula for deciding these
cases has never been conclusively determined.15
IV. THE CANAAN DECISION
A. Equal Protection or First Amendment Analysis
The initial question faced by the court was whether an equal pro-
tection analysis or a first amendment analysis should apply. The
court noted that the United States Supreme Court has traditionally
applied an equal protection analysis.16 However, the application of
this analysis has resulted in dramatically inconsistent results.17 This
inconsistency is due to the fact that the court has not conclusively de-
termined which standard of review to apply.
The court speculated that growing discontent with the equal pro-
10. Id. The supreme court explained that this case was not considered moot
although the election was completed. The court has frequently decided various recur-
ring election issues subsequent to the completion of the elections. See Gould v. Grubb,
14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
11. See SAN DIEGO MUN. CODE § 27.2205 (1985).
12. See injfra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
13. See American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
957 (1968); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
14. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Schuster v. Mun. Court, 109
Cal. App. 3d 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
15. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 777 (1978). See also Note, Bet-
ter Late Than Never: The John Anderson Cases and the Constitutionality of Filing
Deadlines, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (1983).
16. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 711, 710 P.2d at 272, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
17. Id. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 777-84.
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tection approach prompted the United States Supreme Court to begin
utilizing a first amendment analysis.18 In Anderson v. Celebrezze,19
the Court applied a first amendment balancing test and struck down
Ohio's early filing deadline. The Anderson Court noted that a first
amendment analysis does not preclude consideration of equal protec-
tion concerns. 20 They still relied heavily on cases emphasizing funda-
mental rights. The Anderson Court explained its analysis by stating
that a court "'must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.' "21
In deciding to use an Anderson analysis in the present case, the
court stated that this analysis is much more appropriate than the
traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis.22 The court further
commented that this approach focuses the inquiry on the real issues
because it concentrated directly on infringement of first and four-
teenth amendment rights.
2 3
B. Rights to Vote and Seek Public Office
The court agreed with the petitioner's major contention that the
regulation significantly affected two important rights: the right of
candidates to pursue public office, and the right to vote.24 The court
recognized both rights as fundamental and worthy of constitutional
protection.2 5 The court noted that the right to vote is inextricably in-
18. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 711, 710 P.2d at 272, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 472. Unfortunately,
the United States Supreme Court has never clearly defined which standard of review
to apply in analyzing election laws. In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the
Court applied strict scrutiny in striking down Ohio's ballot access requirements.
Although relying heavily on Williams in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), the
Court utilized minimal scrutiny in summarily upholding Georgia's ballot access restric-
tions. In American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), and Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1.974), the Court purportedly subjected the ballot access restrictions to
strict scrutiny, while actually utilizing minimal scrutiny.
19. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
20. Id. at 786-87.
21. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 712, 710 P.2d at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (quoting Ander-
son, 460 U.S. at 789-90).
22. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 713, 710 P.2d at 272, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 714-15, 710 P.2d at 274-75, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75.
25. Id. While the California Supreme Court recognized the right to be a candidate
as a fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court has refused to acknowledge
the right to candidacy as fundamental. While the Court alluded to such a right in Wil-
liams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), this interpretation was explicitly rejected in Bul-
lock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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tertwined with a candidate's right to seek public office.26 It is this
close relationship, the court stated, that necessitates careful judicial
scrutiny of regulations which affect these rights.2 7
Next, the court examined the extent to which the prohibition af-
fected these two separate but related rights. While both rights were
affected, the court concluded that the right to vote was more seri-
ously injured.28 The court explained that the prohibition seriously
injured the right to vote in two ways. First, the candidate that is pre-
ferred by the majority of voters may be precluded from winning the
election.29 The court recognized that this situation is highly probable
in this case because major developments occurred in the interim be-
tween the primary and the general elections. 30
Second, voters are prevented from voting for their preferred candi-
date, regardless of the candidate's chances of winning.3 1 The court
dismissed the respondents' contention that a voter could still write a
person's name on the ballot.32 The court responded that, pursuant to
the regulations, such a ballot would be counted as if the name did not
appear. The court noted that the first amendment "guarantees the
right to public political expression."33 Thus, if the vote is not offi-
cially counted, then it is not given recognition.
C The Balancing Test
In concluding that the prohibition seriously injured the right to
seek public office and the right to vote, the court then applied a bal-
ancing test. The court weighed the severity of the injuries against
the respondents' justifications for the prohibition. The respondents
asserted that the prohibition was necessary to prevent the disruption
that write-in voting creates. 34 It was also necessary to ensure that: 1)
candidates meet charter requirements; 2) candidates have displayed a
willingness to serve; 3) the public will have sufficient time to investi-
gate and evaluate the candidate; and 4) one candidate will receive a
majority of votes.35
In reviewing the respondents' contentions, the court concluded
26. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 714-15, 710 P.2d at 274-75, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 716, 710 P.2d at 276, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 717, 710 P.2d at 276, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
31. Id. Professor Tribe states that "although groups of voters have a right to asso-
ciate and advance a candidate to represent their interests, these associational rights do
not seem to require that any particular individual serve as that candidate." L. TRIBE,
supra note 15, at 775.
32. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 717, 710 P.2d at 276, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 718, 710 P.2d at 277, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
35. Id.
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that a complete prohibition of write-in voting was too overbroad to
achieve the stated goals. The court characterized the ban as too
"crude and imprecise" to assure that candidates meet charter qualifi-
cations and display a willingness to serve.36 The court further held
that the desire to insure that a successful candidate wins a majority
of the vote In the general election was insufficient to justify such a
drastic measure. 37
The court conceded to respondents' concern that voters have a suf-
ficient amount of time to investigate. The court concluded, however,
that limiting the possible candidates to those who signed up five
months prior to the election is unnecessary.38 The court recognized
that voters receive a tremendous amount of knowledge during the
month prior to an election. Write-in voting actually increases the
knowledge of the voters by encouraging discussion of public issues
and candidates.
Respondents further contended that to strike down the prohibition
would severely disrupt their scheme for city council elections. 39 The
court responded by emphasizing that the respondents failed to
demonstrate that a total ban is necessary to achieve their goals.
In balancing the rights of the candidates and voters against the as-
serted justifications, the court held that the prohibition is unconstitu-
tional.40 The court stated that the rights to vote and seek public
office are fundamental, and respondents' interests are insufficient to
justify the burdens placed upon these rights. The court concluded
that decisions in other jurisdictions support their opinion.
V. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Grodin concurred in the judgment and analysis of the ma-
jority as it pertains to elections for mayor and other individually
elected officers.4l Since the quasi-district scheme for city council
elections presents different problems, he concurred in the judgment
36. Id. at 719, 710 P.2d at 278, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
37. Id. at 720, 710 P.2d at 278, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
38. Id.
39. Pursuant to San Diego's system, a primary is held in each of eight districts.
The two candidates from each district who receive the most votes run citywide in the
general election. While one candidate is elected from each district, they are elected
from voters citywide. The respondents argued that to allow a write-in candidate in the
citywide election would permit a candidate to be elected who had no support in the
district that he or she was to represent.
40. Canaan, 40 Cal. 3d at 724, 710 P.2d at 281, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
41. Id. at 727-28, 710 P.2d at 284, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (Grodin, J., concurring).
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as to the validity of the write-in prohibition as it pertains to that spe-
cial system.
In his dissent, Justice Lucas advocated the application of an equal
protection analysis.42 He declared that the real issue is whether the
regulation has "a 'real and appreciable impact' upon the equality,
fairness and integrity of the electoral process." 43 Strict scrutiny
should only be used to review regulations with such impact. In deter-
mining the appropriate equal protection analysis, Justice Lucas
adopted and restated the opinion of the court of appeal.44 Lucas rec-
ognized that while the prohibition did not restrict the right to vote, it
did regulate procedures for prospective candidates.4 5 Since the rights
to vote and to be a candidate are interrelated, strict scrutiny should
be used only if the impact on the right to vote is severe enough.
Mere existence of any restrictions, however, did not require the invo-
cation of the strict scrutiny standard. The court of appeal and Justice
Lucas, therefore, declared the regulation as nondiscriminatory and
having no appreciable impact on the electoral process. The court of
appeal applied the rational basis test, and because the regulation was
rationally related to legitimate governmental interests, that court
held that the ordinance was constitutional. 46
VI. CONCLUSION
The supreme court's decision indicates that ballot access regula-
tions will now be subjected to a first amendment analysis rather than
an equal protection analysis. The court's summary disposition of the
respondents' contentions evidences a willingness to subject all ballot
access regulations to such severe analysis. The court no longer ap-
pears willing to consider the appreciable impact of a regulation in de-
termining the severity of the analysis to be applied. A heavy burden
is placed upon those enacting the regulation to show that the restric-
tion is the least restrictive alternative possible.
TAMI J. TAECKER
42. Id. at 728, 710 P.2d at 284, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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vii. EvIDENCE
A. Evidence of criminal activity introduced in the penalty
phase of a murder trial is limited to evidence of conduct
that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime in
violation of the Penal Code: People v. Phillips.
Former Penal Code section 190.2(b) permits the prosecution to in-
troduce evidence of violent criminal activity committed by a defend-
ant in the penalty phase of a murder trial. In People v. Phillips, 41
Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1985), the supreme court
imposed two requirements on evidence of criminal activity sought to
be admitted without an accompanying conviction: 1) the activity must
be in violation of the Penal Code; and 2) the prosecution must intro-
duce sufficiEcnt evidence to prove that the defendant would have been
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt had he been charged with a
crime.
The court reached this conclusion after examining the legislative
history behind former Penal Code section 190.3(b). The court held
that the legislature did not intend to have evidence of nontriable of-
fenses introduced at the penalty phase. Although evidence of unre-
lated criminal activity can be introduced even where the defendant
had not been convicted of any crimes, the jury cannot consider it as
an aggravating factor in assessing the death penalty unless the prose-
cution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the activity constituted
a Penal Code violation. See People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 840,
457 P.2d 889, 903, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 63 (1969).
The court's decision in Phillips will in all probability apply to the
present section 190.3(b) because of its similar wording. See CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1986). The court did not state whether
a jury must -explicitly find the defendant guilty of a crime before con-
sidering the evidence as an aggravating factor; the "reasonable
doubt" requirement may prove to be prima facie requirement within
the realm of the court and not the jury. Neither did the court ad-
dress the res judicata implications of what could become a "trial
within a trial."
MICHAEL R. GRADISHER
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B. To be admissible, characteristics of a past crime must
be unique or demonstrate a 'signature' which
indicates the defendant perpetuated both the past and
present crimes; a juvenile's request to speak with a
parent implies invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination: People v. Rivera.
In People v. Rivera, 41 Cal. 3d 388, 710 P.2d 362, 221 Cal. Rptr. 562
(1985), defendant David Rivera had been convicted by a jury of mur-
der and burglary. When defendant was arrested three months after
the crime, he asked the arresting officer to contact his father. The
defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights. Although he
first denied involvement in the crime, Rivera later confessed and was
charged with murder under the felony-murder rule. At trial, the de-
fendant argued his confession was a lie, made only to avoid his being
labeled a "snitch." After his conviction, Rivera was sentenced to a
concurrent sentence of twenty-five years to life. On appeal, defend-
ant challenged the admission of his confession, and a statement made
to another police officer, by claiming that these statements were in-
voluntary and only made upon promises received from the police.
The defendant also challenged the evidence admitted at trial con-
cerning his prior armed robbery conviction. The trial court admitted
the prior offense into evidence to establish identity. A prior offense
showing identity, knowledge, common scheme, or design is admissi-
ble under the California Evidence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b)
(West 1966).
The court determined that the evidence regarding defendant's
prior offense should not have been admitted at trial. The court held
that in order for a prior offense to be admitted in a later offense suit,
"the two acts must have enough shared characteristics to raise a
strong inference that they were committed by the same person. It is
not enough that the two acts contain common marks. . . ." Rivera,
41 Cal. 3d at 392, 710 P.2d at 364, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 564. The court con-
cluded that there were not enough "highly distinctive similarities"
between the present and past offenses to justify admission of the
prior offense evidence. Although some similarities existed, the court
pointed out enough dissimilarities between the two offenses such that
no unique, distinctive, or "signature" similarities could be drawn.
The court found that the admission of the prior offense evidence was
sufficient to prejudice the jury against the defendant, since no wit-
nesses were able to identify the defendant, and no physical evidence
was presented which linked him to the crime. Because the prior of-
fense evidence was likely to have greatly influenced the jurors, its
admission was therefore reversible error. See Roth, Understanding
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Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 297 (1982).
Second, the court gave guidance to the trial court, which would
hear the case on retrial, by applying a rule first formulated in People
v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). The
court determined that a juvenile defendant's request to see his father
made prior to his confession must be interpreted as a desire to invoke
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Since the police in this case did not cease their
questioning of the defendant immediately after this request, any
statement or confession made subsequently should have been inad-
missible against the defendant. The court noted that there may exist
unusual circumstances in which a juvenile defendant may, through a
request to see a parent, not invoke the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. However, in the absence of unusual facts, the Burton rule re-
quires that law enforcement officers automatically cease the
questioning of a juvenile in custody upon a request to see a parent.
Evidence gathered in violation of the Burton rule is inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 940. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West
1966). See generally Levy & Skacevic, What Standard Should Be
Used To Determine A Valid Juvenile Waiver?, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
767 (1979).
BRENDA L. THOMAS
viii. FAMILY LAW
Disability payments from private disability insurance
policies purchased with community funds are
community property to the extent that they represent
retirement benefits: In re Marriage of Saslow.
In re Marriage of Saslow, 40 Cal. 3d 848, 710 P.2d 346, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 546 (1985), involved the question whether disability payments
from private disability insurance policies paid for with community
funds constituted separate property of a disabled spouse. The court
held that the portion of the disability benefits intended by the parties
to provide retirement support must be denominated as community
property. The portion of the benefits intended to replace the hus-
band's lost earnings in the event of his disability must be deemed sep-
arate property. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial
court to apportion the retirement and disability payments.
During the marriage, Earnest Saslow purchased several disability
insurance policies with community funds. Saslow, a self-employed al-
lergist, had no retirement or pension plans. Severe psychological
problems forced him to discontinue his medical practice while he was
still married. Payment of the benefits under the disability policies
commenced during the marriage, and certain payments were sched-
uled to continue until his death.
In tracing the development of the characterization of disability pay-
ments, the court noted that the decision of In re Marriage of Jones,
13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975), was no longer
valid. Courts no longer distinguish between vested and nonvested
pension rights. In addition, section 5126 of the Civil Code currently
provides that personal injury damages, which are analagous to disa-
bility payments, are now classified as community assets. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1986).
The court had previously decided that United States military disa-
bility payments are community property to the extent that they rep-
resent retirement benefits; that portion representing disability
payments are deemed separate property. See In re Marriage of Sten-
quist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). The court
noted that while this approach necessitates several difficult factual
determinations, it provides the most equitable distribution of disabil-
ity insurance benefits. To classify certain benefits as either always
community or always separate creates numerous inequities that are
not justified on the grounds of administrative convenience.
The court stated that in determining the extent to which the disa-
bility payments represented retirement benefits, the trial court
should consider several factors on remand. First, the intent of the
parties regarding the purpose of the benefits should be examined.
This is important to illustrate the extent to which the couple relied
on the disability payments to substitute for retirement benefits. In
the present case, the husband had no retirement or pension plan;
thus, the trier of fact could infer that the husband had intended the
disability payments to serve as a substitute for retirement benefits.
Absent evidence of actual intent, the trial court should determine
at what age the spouse would likely have retired had there been no
disability. In the present case, where the spouse is self-employed and
no clear retirement age is provided in any contract, the trial court
may consider the average retirement age of self-employed allergists
in the community with similar experience and education.
The existence of any retirement or pension plans is another rele-
vant factor. The court stated that this is important to determine
whether the disability insurance was purchased in lieu of a retire-
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ment plan. In conclusion, the court applied Stenquist to private disa-
bility plans in apportioning community and separate property.
TAMI J. TAECKER
IX. INSURANCE LAW
A. 'Anti-stacking' statute is fully applicable to two or more
policies issued by the same insurer: Wagner v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
In Wagner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 40
Cal. 3d 460, 709 P.2d 462, 220 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1985), the plaintiff, Su-
san Welch, had been seriously injured in an automobile collision with
an uninsured motorist. The plaintiff was covered under two liability
policies issued by the defendant, State Farm Insurance, to Ms.
Welch's parent and step-parent, also plaintiffs in this suit. Each pol-
icy provided for uninsured motorist coverage up to $15,000 and con-
tained a condition clause known as an "anti-stacking clause," used by
insurance companies to prevent claimant's recovery in excess of ac-
tual damages, or double recovery for the same injury.
Under California Insurance Code section 11580.2(d), anti-stacking
clauses are permitted. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(d) (West Supp.
1986) (hereinafter the Anti-stacking Statute). The plaintiff's injuries
were in excess of $15,000. The plaintiffs argued: 1) the anti-stacking
clause under the policy was incomprehensible and therefore did not
comport with the Anti-stacking Statute; and 2) the Anti-stacking
Statute should not apply here because both policies were issued by
the same insurer. Therefore, plaintiff should be entitled to collect
the maximum amount payable under both policies - $15,000 from
each for a total of $30,000. Defendant State Farm paid plaintiff
$15,000, the policy limit on one policy, but refused to pay more. At
trial, defendant was granted summary judgment, from which plain-
tiffs appealed.
First, the supreme court found that the language used by defend-
ant State Farm in the clause was as clear as the Anti-stacking Statute
would allow. The difficult language inherent in both the clause and
statute is a result of explaining the pro-rating scheme which applies
when different insurance companies are involved in one claim. How-
ever, both the clause and the statute clearly limit claimant's damages
to the higher of the applicable policies held. Second, the issue was
whether such a condition under the statute, although clearly worded,
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is applicable to two policies drawn by the same company. The court
held that the statute was applicable in this situation.
Plaintiffs argued that if the limit on the first policy was the maxi-
mum amount defendant insurer would have to pay, then plaintiffs'
payment of the uninsured motorist premium on the second policy
was without purpose. Therefore, the defendant company received
two premiums but would pay only one uninsured motorist benefit.
Since the defendant insurer issued both policies to plaintiffs and
reaped two premiums, plaintiffs argued that in fairness they should
be able to collect on both policies as issued, regardless of the Anti-
Stacking Statute.
The court did not agree with plaintiffs' analysis. First, plaintiffs
did receive something for the second premium paid - additional cov-
erage for the additional risks involved in the ownership of two vehi-
cles. Furthermore, this additional coverage protected drivers of the
second vehicle, not necessarily covered by the premium paid under
the first policy. Second, although the pro-rating portion of the stat-
ute does not take effect with one company as insurer, the legislative
purpose behind the Anti-stacking Statute was to prevent squabbles
between insurance companies, not to make pro-rating an end in and
of itself. The court noted the insured, after being paid the full limit
on the greatest policy, is compensated and is no worse off because
pro-rating was avoided. Additionally, if the Anti-stacking Statute
was not applicable to insurance companies, insurance companies
could not rely upon decreased exposure through contribution by
other insurers or in this case themselves. Therefore, uninsured mo-
torist coverage would be more costly to claimants such as the
plaintiffs.
Lastly, plaintiffs argued that the defendant insurance company
owed a duty to inform them of the limitations contained in the clause
and its applicability when two such policies are held concurrently.
The court held that because defendant insurance company complied
with the required language and protection demanded under the Anti-
Stacking Statute, and clearly stated the limitations in its policies, the
defendant did not breach its duty to plaintiffs and no cause of action
for breach is justified. Defendant's summary judgment was therefore
affirmed. See generally P. Eisler, California Uninsured Motorist
Law Handbook § 8.7 (3d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1982).
BRENDA L. THOMAS
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B. Settlement offers made after trial's commencement
are admissible to prove a title insurance company's
failure to employ good faith and fair dealing: White
v. Western Title Insurance Co.
In White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d
309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985), the plaintiffs wished to purchase prop-
erty which, unbeknownst to them, was encumbered by a duly re-
corded water easement. The plaintiffs requested and received
preliminary title reports from the defendant which purported to list
all easements, liens, and encumbrances of record. However, the re-
ports failed to disclose the recorded water easement. Believing the
property was free of encumbrances, the plaintiffs and the seller
closed escrow and were then issued two title insurance policies by the
defendant. The policies generally insured the plaintiffs against
losses, damages, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred if title to the
property proved contrary to that stated in the policy, or if title as de-
scribed was encumbered by defect, lien, or other encumbrances.
Schedule B of the policies contained exclusion provisions limiting de-
fendant's liability as to unrecorded easements, liens, or encum-
brances, and to unpatented mining claims, reserved patents, or water
rights.
Approximately six months after escrow closed, the owner of the
easement encumbering plaintiffs' property notified the plaintiffs of
his intent to implement the easement. The plaintiffs retained sepa-
rate counsel, although the defendant offered to defend plaintiffs in
the easement suit. After the easement suit was dismissed, the plain-
tiffs sought compensation of $62,947 from the defendant, which was
the potential loss created by the undiscovered easement through loss
of groundwater. The defendant contested the plaintiffs' claim of loss,
whereupon the plaintiffs filed a suit for breach of insurance contract
and negligent preparation of the preliminary title reports.
After the suit was filed, the defendant attempted to settle by offer-
ing $3,000; this amount was based upon its appraiser's $2,000 estimate
of the loss. The plaintiffs, who never received a copy of the ap-
praiser's report, declined the offer. The defendant's second settle-
ment offer, made pursuant to Civil Procedure Code section 998, was
for $5,000. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1980). The plain-
tiffs rejected this second offer since they had incurred litigation ex-
penses exceeding that amount. They instead chose to amend their
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complaint to include a cause of action for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
In 1981, the trial court, without a jury, found the defendant liable
for breach of contract and negligence. A third offer of $15,000 by the
defendant to settle the case was rejected by plaintiffs. A jury trial
began in 1982 to decide the case's remaining issues. The court admit-
ted testimony as to the extent of losses and the defendant's at-
tempted settlement offers that were made without the plaintiffs'
knowledge of the appraiser's report. The jury found the defendant in
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and awarded
$20,000 in compensatory damages. The jury denied punitive damages.
Defendant appealed the judgment.
The supreme court first determined that the title insurance policy
in question must be construed in a light most favorable to the in-
sured. Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d 764,
180 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1982). The purpose of the policy was to insure the
plaintiffs against undisclosed recorded interests, thereby specifically
including the recorded water rights at issue, since such rights were
within the scope of an ordinary title search. The court described the
defendant's duty broadly to include protection of the title insurance
policyholder's reasonable expectation as against all recorded water
rights. Although the insurance policy made reference to excluded
water rights protection, these excluded rights were unrecorded water
rights. Therefore, protection against the recorded easement here in
question was part of the bargained-for protection the defendant owed
to the plaintiffs.
The general duty required of all title insurers includes a profes-
sional abstraction of title. Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal. App. 3d 641,
650, 172 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258 (1981). A title report prepared by such an
insurer who fails to list all recorded encumbrances is prima facie
proof of negligence. Yet in this case, although the defendant's negli-
gence was evident by its lack of adequate title search, the defendant
attempted to free itself from liability through Insurance Code section
12340.11. This section provides that preliminary title reports cannot
be construed as a final guarantee of the state of title. CAL. INS. CODE
§ 12340.11 (West Supp. 1986). Although this section could have excul-
pated the defendant's liability, the court found it inapplicable to the
present case, since the statute came into effect on January 1, 1982,
and was without retroactive effect upon the defendant's conduct,
which occurred in 1981. Therefore, the court affirmed the finding
that the defendant negligently breached its duty to the plaintiffs.
Every title insurance contract implies a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing between the parties. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 940, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (1975). The de-
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fendant argued that in order to disprove the alleged breach of this
implied covenant, all evidence of its dealings with plaintiffs after suit
was filed should have been excluded, since upon commencement of
the suit, the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into adversary posi-
tions which were naturally contradictory to the covenant. However,
the court held that the contractual relationship between an insured
and an insurer continues after suit is commenced. To hold otherwise
would encourage insurers to engage in early suit and to forego inves-
tigation, negotiation, and settlement. The court expressed confidence
in the jury's ability to distinguish the parties' adversary roles from
the insurer's duty to continue to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured.
The defendant also argued that the admission of the two settle-
ment offers was in violation of California Evidence Code section 1152.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1986). Although this section
generally prohibits introduction of settlement offers into evidence,
the court determined that the section does not preclude settlement
offers as evidence to prove failure to process an insurance claim
fairly and in good faith. On similar grounds, the court found that the
defendant's compromise offer, made pursuant to section 998, was also
admissible. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1980).
The court additionally rejected the defendant's argument that its
communications to the plaintiffs were absolutely privileged as being
part of a judicial proceeding. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 47(2) (West
1982). The court found that the defendant's conduct and communica-
tions were not introduced as proof of defamation or intent to cause
emotional distress - causes of action which invoke the privilege. In-
stead, proof was offered to evidence the defendant insurer's overall
conduct in its resolution of insureds' claims, which is relevant to a
cause of action for breach of good faith and fair dealing. For the pur-
pose of demonstrating this type of conduct, section 47(2) does not act
to bar such evidence.
The court found that the defendant's "entire pattern of conduct
shows a clear attempt by defendant to avoid responsibility for its ob-
vious failure to discover and report the recorded easement. . ....
White, 40 Cal. 3d at 889, 710 P.2d at 319, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
Although the defendant was confronted with a unanimous body of
law against it, it offered only limited damages in its settlement offer
and refused to adequately assess plaintiffs' losses until the court de-
cided in plaintiffs' favor. The jury's finding of breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing was therefore justified. An award for
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attorneys' and witness fees, and other litigation expenses was justi-
fied because the plaintiffs were entitled, in light of insurer's unrea-
sonable conduct, to recover for damages that proximately resulted
from the bad faith. See generally J. Hosack, D. Wescott & A. Knox,
Preliminary Title Reports, Title Policies, and Closing Procedures
(1985) (general guidelines regarding preliminary title reports and fil-
ing title insurance).
BRENDA L. THOMAS
x. LABOR LAW
A. City personnel rule which prohibits "unbecoming
conduct" is not unconstitutionally vague when viewed in
light of specific case facts: Cranston v. City of Richmond.
In Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal. 3d 755, 710 P.2d 845, 221
Cal. Rptr. 779 (1985), appellant Eric Cranston challenged his dis-
charge as a police officer by the respondent City of Richmond. Cran-
ston was discharged when he drove his mechanically unsafe
automobile in a high speed chase while off-duty and while being pur-
sued by fellow police officers. The chase occurred during the dark,
early morning hours, on wet, slippery roads, increasing the danger to
the other officers, motorists, himself, and a passenger. When finally
stopped, Cranston treated the incident as a joke. Although he had
clearly violated the law, Cranston was not issued a citation. The po-
lice department conducted an investigation and reviewed Cranston's
past record of several official reprimands. Cranston had previously
received notice that his performance was unacceptable and was told
to improve it. In view of the chase incident and Cranston's past mis-
conduct, Cranston was terminated for "conduct unbecoming an em-
ployee of the City Service" under Richmond City Personnel Rule
XII, section 2(a) (hereinafter the City Rule).
After his discharge, Cranston was granted a hearing before the city
personnel board. After hearing the evidence, the board affirmed his
discharge. Cranston thereupon filed a petition for writ of administra-
tive mandamus with the superior court to compel his reinstatement.
Cranston's petition was denied and this appeal was subsequently
brought.
The supreme court had to determine whether a police officer, who
continued to engage in further misconduct, although warned about
past misconduct, may escape discipline under a municipal personnel
rule which contains an arguably vague term. The court upheld the
discharge in a narrow interpretation of law under the specific facts
presented in this case.
Cranston's main argument before the court was that the City Rule
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was unconstitutionally vague, and hence did not provide Cranston
with his essential due process rights. The City Rule provided that
any city employee could be discharged for conduct unbecoming a City
Service employee. Cranston argued that the City Rule's use of the
term "unbecoming" was so vague that reasonable people would have
to guess as to its meaning.
Under established constitutional law principles, vague laws violate
basic due process because they may trap the unknowing, and tend to
lead to arbitrary and discriminatory applications of law. Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Although normally ap-
plied in criminal cases, the "void for vagueness" doctrine is also appli-
cable to administrative regulations and was therefore applied here.
See Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1121 (1975).
Although the court accepted the basic "void for vagueness" doc-
trine as Cranston argued, it determined that the doctrine must be ap-
plied to the City Rule in light of the specific facts of the case, and not
in the abstract. Although Cranston then argued that the City Rule
was so patently vague as to provide no standard at all, the court dis-
agreed. Although the term "unbecoming" alone provided no specific,
objective measurement of appropriate conduct for city employees, the
court held that this word provides adequate meaning when "the re-
quired specificity . . . [is] provided by the common knowledge and
understanding of members of the particular vocation or profession to
which the statute applies." Cranston, 40 Cal. 3d at 765, 710 P.2d at
851, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 784. The court affirmed a line of cases in which
fitness within a specific occupation was at issue. Claims of vagueness
over the applicable rule were rejected because the common knowl-
edge of profession members provided notice of the fitness standards
within that profession.
Cranston attempted to distinguish the City Rule from similar rules
upheld by the court by arguing that the City Rule applied to all city
employees instead of only one category of employees. Cranston ar-
gued that because the City Rule included such a broad category of
employees, it failed to give any particular guidance or incorporate
any specific profession. The court distinguished the cases which iden-
tified such am overbroad employee category, and found that the
grounds for discharge in each case lacked the kind of close relation-
ship to the employee's professional standard of fitness present in the
case at hand. The City Rule was held to conform more closely to the
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line of cases where the rule or regulation identified a specific occupa-
tion because the City intended the City Rule to apply to and depend
upon the specific occupation involved.
The court thus interpreted the City Rule as if it read "conduct un-
becoming a city police officer." By so incorporating the intended ap-
plication of a standard within a chosen occupation, and then
determining the meaning of "unbecoming conduct" within that pro-
fession, the City Rule was held sufficiently clear, having a "core"
upon which prohibited "hard core" conduct could be disciplined.
Having decided that the City Rule passed the constitutional test
and was therefore not void for vagueness, Cranston's conduct in light
of his profession was found to be clearly prohibited under the rule.
Because Cranston's reckless and blatant disregard for the law was
the type of conduct which any reasonable police officer would know
was "unbecoming," his conduct was "hard core" and clearly violative
of the City Rule. Cranston had received ample verbal notice regard-
ing past misconduct and had notice through a police department
manual that his conduct was prohibited.
Under the specific circumstances in this case, discharge was for just
cause and within the discretion of the administrative agency. The
court found no abuse of discretion by the agency and no denial of
Cranston's right to representation during the investigatory proceed-
ing. The court therefore affirmed the superior court's denial of Cran-
ston's petition and upheld his discharge.
BRENDA L. THOMAS
B. The National Football League's arbitration agreement
for player grievances is valid under both federal and
state law: Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams.
Ruling on a question of federal law, the court in Dryer v. Los Ange-
les Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 709 P.2d 826, 220 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1985), up-
held the validity of the arbitration agreement in the National
Football League (hereinafter the NFL) collective bargaining agree-
ment. Fred Dryer sued the Los Angeles Rams for removing him
from the player roster before the expiration of his contract, even
though the team continued his salary. The Rams responded in supe-
rior court by petitioning to compel arbitration pursuant to the NFL
collective bargaining agreement.
The trial court recognized that federal law is controlling in labor
questions involving the NFL, but also determined that California and
federal laws were compatible. Upon that basis, the lower court ruled
the arbitration agreement invalid. Most objectionable to the superior
and also the appellate courts was a provision in the agreement that
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authorized the NFL Commissioner to arbitrarily intervene in any dis-
pute that threatens public confidence in professional football. The
arbitration agreement was held to be a contract of adhesion, and un-
conscionable for failing to meet minimum levels of integrity as set
forth in Graham v. Scissor-Tail Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171
Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
In reversing the decision, the supreme court stated that there is no
federal precedent that embodies the fairness inquiry mandated by
the California court in Graham. On the contrary, national labor pol-
icy strongly encourages all methods of private dispute resolution. In-
consistent state laws result in crippling the effectiveness of labor
arbitration and weakening the status of a union in the collective bar-
gaining process. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653
(1965). See also 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982) (congressional preference
for contractual procedures to solve labor grievances).
Furthermore, the court found that the NFL arbitration provisions
met the Graham integrity test. The intervention by the NFL Com-
missioner that the lower courts found so blatantly arbitrary was, in
reality, limited by the agreement to a narrow set of exigent circum-
stances involving such things as drug abuse and gambling. The no-
tion that there could be intervention in this case was pure
speculation on the part of the lower courts. Additionally, no prece-
dent was found for application of the doctrine of adhesion to collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
In summary, the supreme court found error in the lower courts'
failure to find that state law was preempted by federal law in decid-
ing an NFL labor dispute. After applying the federal standard, the
court found. the arbitration agreement to be consistent with national
policy. Federal law aside, the agreement was also found to be in com-
pliance with California law.
This decision will undoubtedly have a profound impact on the rem-
edies available to players of the NFL teams, if not to all professional
sports franchises located in California. For an overview of NFL labor
arrangements, see Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices During
the 1982 National Football League Strike: Help on the Way, 6 U.
BRIDGEPOR.c L. REV. 189 (1985).
JAMES B. BRISTOL
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C. The make-whole remedy is properly imposed upon an
employer who refuses to bargain with a newly-elected
union where there is no reasonable, good faith belief
that the election will be set aside: George Arakelian
Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In finding that the employer's efforts to set aside the results of a
union election were not based upon a reasonable belief of eventual
success, the statutory make-whole remedy was permitted in George
Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board.1 The
court held that the election challenge brought by Arakelian Farms
was wholly lacking in merit even though it was not expressly stated
that it was brought as a mere dilatory tactic to stifle union
organization. 2
II. FACTS
In December of 1976, the employees of Arakelian Farms voted on
their desire to be represented by the United Farm Workers of
America (UFW). Of the 168 ballots cast, 139 favored the UFW and
twelve were opposed to representation by any union. Seventeen bal-
lots were challenged and unresolved. Arakelian then petitioned to
set aside the election.3 After most complaints in the petition were
dismissed by the executive secretary of the Agricultural Labor Rela-
tions Board (ALRB), Arakelian sought review of the denial by the
full board. Unfortunately, this request for review was not filed
within the five day time limit. Arakelian did not seek reconsidera-
tion of the earlier petition, 4 nor did it present reasons for the lateness
of the review request.
One objection in the first petition was not dismissed by the ALRB.
Arakelian complained that the UFW had interfered in the election
process and that the ALRB's participation in the pre-election confer-
1. 40 Cal. 3d 654, 710 P.2d 288, 221 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1985). The opinion was au-
thored by Justice Kaus, with acting Chief Justice Broussard and Justices Mosk, Rey-
noso, and Grodin concurring. Justice Lucas wrote a separate dissent in which Justice
Sabraw concurred.
Justice Kaus was a retired associate justice of the supreme court sitting under as-
signment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Counsel. Justice Sabraw was assigned by
the Chairperson of the Judicial Counsel.
2. Id. at 667, 710 P.2d at 296, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
3. This petition was filed in a timely fashion with the California Agricultural La-
bor Relations Board (ALRB) pursuant to statutory and administrative provisions. See
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R. 20365
(1981). Most of the objections were summarily dismissed by the executive secretary of
the ALRB as deficient.
4. Such review is permitted under the California Administrative Code. CAL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 8, R. 20393(c) (1981).
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ence was biased and openly supportive of the union. Specifically, the
agent of the ALRB delayed the conference with the employees for
ninety minutes to wait for the UFW representatives to arrive, and
then permitted a union organizer to act as interpreter to the Spanish
speaking employees. Other alleged misconduct by the agent included
strategic placement of the voting sites in accordance with the union's
wishes.
The ALRB agreed that there was misconduct in the election, but
found it to be inconsequential. Certification was soon granted to the
UFW as the bargaining representative for Arakelian's employees.
After several failed attempts to get a more favorable result from the
ALRB, Arakelian refused to negotiate with the UFW. This refusal to
bargain was found to be an unfair labor practice, and the ALRB im-
posed the statutory make-whole remedy.5 Arakelian petitioned the
court of appeal to set aside the certification of the UFW or, in the al-
ternative, to find that the ALRB had abused its discretion in granting
the make-whole remedy.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
While the writ of review was being considered, the supreme court
decided a similar case. In JR. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Rela-
tions Board,6 the court ruled that the make-whole remedy would be
appropriate only where the employer's conduct in contesting union
election results was a mere pretense to avoid bargaining with the
union.7 It must appear that the employer had a reasonable good faith
belief that the election violation would have effected the outcome of
the vote.8 Such an evaluation requires a careful examination by the
ALRB of the facts and equities of each case. 9
In applying the Norton rule, the ALRB set forth evidentiary stan-
dards that employers would have to meet in order to show a good
faith belief in the merits of their challenge to the union election.
The court gave tacit approval to these standards. A challenge and re-
5. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1986). Under the make-whole rem-
edy, the ALRE; is empowered to take any affirmative action necessary. This includes
ordering the employer to pay any amount adequate to make the employees whole from
the losses suffered during the refusal to bargain period. See Note, Make Whole Under
the Agricultural Labor Relations Act: Its Applicability and Scope, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 971
(1979).
6. 26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1979).
7. Id. at 39, 603 P.2d at 1328, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 33, 603 P.2d at 1327, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
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fusal to bargain is considered reasonable only if the employer be-
lieved in good faith that the results of an election would eventually
be set aside. Pertinent to the determination of reasonableness are
the size of the election, the extent of voter turnout, and the margin
of victory. Additionally, common sense and legal precedent for the
employer's contentions are vital in the analysis.O
Thus, the court examined the circumstances of the Arakelian elec-
tion to determine if the facts supported a reasonable, good faith belief
that the election would be set aside. In applying this standard of re-
view, it was emphasized that the issue is not the bias or misconduct
of the ALRB, or their alleged error in dismissing Arakelian's objec-
tions. Rather, the proper inquiry into the propriety of Arakelian's
refusal to bargain with the union is whether there was a reasonable
chance of winning on appeal."1
Of primary importance to the court was the union's overwhelming
margin of victory. The court was not convinced that the misconduct
of the ALRB agent could have had a significant impact on the elec-
tion results. Furthermore, Arakelian failed to exhaust administra-
tive remedies before refusing to bargain with the UFW.12 Therefore,
the statutory make-whole remedy imposed by the ALRB upon
Arakelian was upheld.13
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Lucas dissented from the imposition of the make-whole
remedy. His objection to the finding of the majority was their will-
ingness to impose such a severe and costly sanction in a case where
the employer's refusal to bargain was based upon actual ALRB
misconduct. 14
In light of the standard of review described in Norton,1 5 Lucas
viewed Arakelian's acts as falling far short of being frivolous, or a
10. Arakelian, 40 Cal. 3d at 664-65, 710 P.2d at 294-95, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 494-95.
11. Id. at 665-66, 710 P.2d at 295, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
12. Id. at 668, 710 P.2d at 297, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
13. Id.
14. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
15. See Norton, 26 Cal. 3d at 36, 603 P.2d at 1326, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 730. The Norton
court stated that the pursuit of judicial review was not itself contrary to the policies of
the Agricultural Labor Relations Act. The make-whole remedy was therefore appro-
priate only where the employer sought review of an election as a "dilatory tactic
designed to stifle union organization." In deciding when the make-whole remedy
should be imposed, concerns of avoiding unnecessary delays as well as providing a
check on arbitrary ALRB action should be considered. Id.
Lucas was apparently disturbed by the majority's willingness to ignore the unques-
tioned misconduct of the ALRB agent during the pre-election conference. This objec-
tion is particularly significant when one remembers that the ALRB is the body that
reviews allegations of ALRB misconduct, and has the corresponding power to impose
the make-whole remedy.
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bad faith attempt to thwart the will of its employees to unionize. 16
On the contrary, the Norton decision expressly forbade imposing a
hindsight test in which a make-whole remedy is imposed simply be-
cause the employer failed in its attempt to adequately state a prima
facie case of consequential misconduct. 17
Furthermore, Lucas did not think the make-whole remedy should
be applied to an election that occurred almost ten years ago. The
statutory damages that could be imposed upon Arakelian from such a
drastic measure could be financially ruinous. The dissenting Justice
saw this type of action as particularly inappropriate in this case be-
cause the delay was not wholly the fault of the employer.' 8
V. CONCLUSION
In light of this decision, an agricultural employer should proceed
with caution before refusing to bargain with a newly elected labor
union. The majority opinion comes very close to stating that seeking
election review and refusing to bargain with a union is appropriate
only where the ALRB's misconduct is so egregious that there is a
definite, quantifiable impact upon the actual vote count.19 If there is
any merit in the dissenting opinion, then this could have a chilling
effect upon the bringing of meritorious claims for election miscon-
duct against the ALRB. This result would be contrary to the policies
expressed in. the carefully reasoned Norton opinion.
JAMES B. BRISTOL
D. A police officer cannot be discharged for refusing to
testify at an administrative police misconduct
hearing unless he is informed that his statements
cannot be used against him at a subsequent criminal
proceeding: Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles.
In Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710 P.2d 329, 221
16. Arakelian, 40 Cal. 3d at 670, 710 P.2d at 298, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. (citing Norton, 26 Cal. 3d at 39, 603 P.2d at 1328, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 732).
18. Arakelian, 40 Cal. 3d at 671, 710 P.2d at 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 499 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
19. This is the standard the UFW argued for in its brief to the ALRB in this case.
Id. at 664, 710 'P.2d at 294, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 494. See also California Supreme Court
Survey, The Proper Test for Determining a Violation of the A.L.R.A.: Martori Broth-
ers Distributor v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 764
(1982).
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Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985), the supreme court was asked to interpret vari-
ous provisions of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights
Act. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3300-3304 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) (here-
inafter the Act). The case arose after Lybarger, a police officer, was
denied a peremptory writ of mandate to set aside an administrative
decision removing him from his position for misconduct.
In 1980, appellant Lybarger reported to work and was informed of
a major misconduct investigation involving his work unit. He was
then transported to an administrative interview and provided with
counsel by his union. Appellant was informed of the allegations of
misconduct and that his failure to cooperate in the investigation
could result in the loss of his job. After consulting his attorney, ap-
pellant stated that he would not cooperate even though his refusal
could result in a charge of insubordination. Based upon the investi-
gative interview, the administrative board found appellant guilty of
insubordination and as a result removed him from his position.
Appellant moved to have the discharge set aside because his rights
under the Act had been violated. First, appellant argued that he
could not be disciplined for exercising his constitutional right to re-
main silent under section 3.304(a) of the Government Code. The
court rejected this argument and held that a public employee has no
right to refuse to answer an employer's "potentially incriminating
questions." The court justified its position by noting that the right
against self-incrimination is adequately protected by the rule prohib-
iting the use of such statements at any subsequent criminal proceed-
ing. See Lejkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1973).
Second, appellant argued that if he had no right to remain silent,
he should have been informed, pursuant to section 3033(g) of the Act,
that any statements he chose to make at the investigation could not
be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. See Leflowitz, 414 U.S.
at 79. Section 3303(g) provides that "if it is deemed that [an officer]
may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immediately in-
formed of his constitutional rights." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3303(g)
(West 1980).
However, in interpreting section 3303(g), the court noted that,
given the context of an administrative investigation of potential crim-
inal misconduct, the legislature had intended that officers be advised
of their Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The court determined that appellant should have been informed that,
despite his constitutional right to remain silent, his silence could be
deemed insubordination, which could result in administrative
discipline.
The court added that appellant should have been advised that any
statement made under the threat of administrative discipline could
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not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. This
particular ornission was of critical importance to the court. The ap-
pellant's failure to understand this rule in conjunction with the gen-
eral Miranda rights was determined to have an unlawful effect on
appellant's decision to remain silent.
Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court erred in de-
nying the pEremptory writ of mandate to set aside the employment
termination decision, and it reversed the judgment. In affording even
police officers the right to Miranda warnings, this case verifies the
strong stand of the court when such constitutional rights are at issue.
CHRISTIE A. MOON
XI. PROBATE LAW
Even in the absence of a timely contest, courts may
exercise their equitable jurisdiction to set aside orders
and decrees of probate proceedings where extrinsic fraud
has been committed by an executor: Estate of Sanders v.
Sutton.
In Estate of Sanders v. Sutton, 40 Cal. 3d 607, 710 P.2d 232, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 432 (1985), the supreme court held that concealment and mis-
representation by an executor constitutes extrinsic fraud. Because a
confidential relationship existed between the beneficiaries of the will
and the executor, breach of the executor's duty to disclose was con-
sidered to be extrinsic fraud. Therefore, equity permitted the order
admitting the decedent's will to probate to be set aside.
The decedent, Mary Sanders, suffered an aneurysm and was de-
clared mentally incompetent in 1957. Her son was appointed the con-
servator of her estate and was the sole beneficiary of her holographic
will. He died in 1978, and the decedent's nephew, Sutton, was ap-
pointed conservator. The son's widow, Sara Sanders, expected her
sons to inherit the entire estate by right of representation. Sutton,
after becoming conservator in 1978, took the decedent to his attorney
where she executed a will leaving him all of her one-third interest in
a panel of real property located in downtown San Diego. Her inter-
est in this property, referred to as the "Market Street property," was
worth about $475,000 and made up the bulk of her estate.
After Mary Sanders died in January of 1983, Sara Sanders ques-
tioned Sutto:a about potential tax liabilities of the real estate. He was
evasive in his answers, telling her not to worry. He told her that he
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would work with the attorney to ensure everything was handled
properly. In February, upon notice that the will was offered for pro-
bate, Sara again questioned Sutton, who further assured her that he
was handling the matter and that her sons' interests were being
properly represented.
In April, July, and September of 1983, Sara and her son attempted
to contact Sutton to find out why the statements they received did
not mention the Market Street property. In January of 1984, Sara
was finally able to talk to Sutton about the notice of final hearing
and taxes due on the property. Sutton continued to assure her that
she need not worry because he was handling the matter. He also told
her that she need not attend the hearing. Finally, after repeated in-
quiries, Sutton admitted that Mrs. Sanders had changed her will leav-
ing her interest in the Market Street property to him. Sara
immediately contacted an attorney, who contested the petition at the
final hearing. The court rejected the contest and entered a decree of
final distribution, awarding the decedent's interest in the Market
Street property to Sutton. Sara and her sons appealed, arguing that
Sutton's misrepresentations and concealments prevented a timely
contest of the will and constituted extrinsic fraud.
Sutton did not dispute the facts as presented and the court there-
fore accepted them as true. Sutton instead claimed that even if the
allegations were true, they did not support a claim of extrinsic fraud,
and in the absence of a timely appeal, a plaintiff is required to prove
extrinsic fraud in order to secure equitable relief from a judgment.
See generally Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 23 P.2d 758 (1933).
The court found evidence of extrinsic fraud under its varied defini-
tions. The court held that fraud includes false promises, deprivation
of a fair hearing, being kept in ignorance of proceedings, and being
induced not to appear, all of which were present in this case. See
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878); In re Mar-
riage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d 337, 342, 612 P.2d 882, 886, 165 Cal. Rptr. 792,
796 (1980). Since courts are more likely to grant relief from a judg-
ment violating a fiduciary duty, Sutton's misleading behavior as both
executor and confidential family advisor indicated that relief was in
order.
Sutton committed fraud when he breached his fiduciary duty to
disclose the material changes which occurred in the will. See, e.g.,
Larrabee v. Tracey, 21 Cal. 2d 645, 134 P.2d 265 (1943) (executor told
beneficiary that she would receive the estate by right of representa-
tion, then asked the court to distribute it to himself). Therefore, the
supreme court set aside the order admitting the decedent's will to
probate, and remanded the case to determine the validity of the will.
CYNTHIA M. WALKER
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XII. PUBLXC UTILITIES
A publicly-owned carrier must exercise the utmost care
in protecting riders from assaults by fellow passengers,
governmental tort immunity notwithstanding: Lopez v.
Southern California Rapid Transit District.
In denying a defense of governmental tort immunity, the supreme
court held that a public transportation corporation owes the same
high duty of care for its passengers as does a private carrier. Lopez v.
Southern California Rapid Transit District, 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d
907, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985). The action came on appeal of a demur-
rer that had been granted in favor of the defendant in the trial court.
Based upon the special relationship between a common carrier and
its passengers, the court found that there is a duty requiring a carrier
to exercise a high degree of care to ensure the safety of its riders.
Accordingly, the carrier must make reasonable efforts to protect its
passengers from the criminal actions of third parties.
The five plaintiffs brought this suit against the Southern California
Rapid Transit District (hereinafter RTD), a public corporation, after
being injured when a fight broke out on board an RTD bus. The
plaintiffs alleged that a group of juveniles began harrassing other rid-
ers while the plaintiffs were on the bus as passengers. A violent ar-
gument ensued between the youths and passengers, while the bus
driver continued driving as if nothing had happened. The plaintiffs
further alleged that such violent incidents had occurred frequently
on that particular bus route, so that the RTD had notice of the risk of
danger to the passengers. In spite of this history, RTD did nothing to
prevent the further endangerment of passengers from the allegedly
known criminal elements. In defense of the action, RTD claimed it
was immune due to the provision of Government Code section 815.
The code states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute. . . [a]
public entity is not liable for an injury [which] . . . arises out of an
act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980) (emphasis added). Con-
versely, section 2100 of the Civil Code provides that a carrier of per-
sons for reward must use the utmost care for the safety of the
passengers, and must exercise that care with reasonable skill. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 1985).
The court examined these statutes and prior case law imposing lia-
bility upon public corporations and came to the conclusion that Civil
Code section 2100 is an express statutory exception to the general
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grant of immunity in Government Code section 815. Therefore, the
court held that RTD was not immune from liability if it had in fact
failed to exercise a sufficient degree of care.
Even though common carriers must exercise a high degree of care,
the court stated that they are not insurers of passenger safety. The
degree of care and diligence which they must exercise is only that
which can be reasonably exercised in light of the mode of transporta-
tion and the practical operations of the carrier. See 11 Cal. Jur. 3d
Carriers § 63 (1974). Nonetheless, the duty imposed upon carriers in-
cludes the responsibility to use reasonable efforts to protect passen-
gers from assaults by other riders. Terrell v. Key System, 69 Cal.
App. 2d 682, 159 P.2d 704 (1945). In affirming the Terrell decision,
the court noted that this majority rule is supported by virtually all
courts and commentators.
RTD asserted three defenses to possible liability. First, it claimed
that imposing the duty to protect passengers from criminal assaults
would create an undue financial burden upon the transit system.
They argued that nothing short of an armed security force could be
expected to effectively curb criminal violence on board its buses.
The court rejected this argument stating that the duty to exercise
reasonable care in protecting passengers is not the functional
equivalent of requiring armed security on every bus. On the con-
trary, there are a number of actions which the court suggested might
be sufficient to fulfill the carrier's obligation. For example, the
driver could, in appropriate situations, warn unruly passengers to
quiet down or get off the bus. A two-way radio could be provided to
allow the driver to summon help from police or RTD security.
Alarm lights could be installed on the outside of the bus to alert the
police of an emergency, and bus drivers could be trained to recognize
and handle potentially volatile situations.
The court did not make these recommendations, however, to sug-
gest that such actions would always be sufficient to absolve the com-
mon carrier, or that a failure to do any or all of the actions would
result in liability. The court was only listing precautionary measures
which a carrier could take, and would impose little, if any, financial
hardship.
Second, RTD asserted that there could be no duty to protect pas-
sengers from third party assaults because there was no special rela-
tionship between the transit district and the riders. The court flatly
rejected this contention. The court stated that a common carrier has
a special relationship with its passengers by the very nature of the
business in which they are engaged, whether or not the customer det-
rimentally relies upon the carrier. See Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College District, 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal.
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Rptr. 842 (1984) (special relationship between college administration
and students); Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.
3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (special relationship be-
tween psychiatrist and patient). But cf Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d
18, 664 P.2d 1.37, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983) (police officer and motorists
have no special relationship giving rise to an affirmative duty).
Third, the court rejected arguments by RTD that they were im-
mune from liability under other statutory provisions. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 820.2 (West 1980) (no liability for negligent exercise of dis-
cretionary authority); id. § 845 (no liability for failure to provide ade-
quate police protection). These contentions were rejected on the
basis of the statutory duty of care imposed upon common carriers in
Civil Code section 2100. Because the court deemed section 2100 to be
a statutory exception to government tort immunity, RTD was given
no shield of protection by the Government Code provisions.
The court concluded that all carriers, public or private, have a duty
of utmost care and diligence to protect their riders from assaults by
fellow passengers. The court reiterated that carriers will not be
strictly liable for all harm suffered by a passenger at the hands of
others. Liability will be imposed only in those situations where the
carrier knows or should have known that an assault was likely to oc-
cur, and it had the ability, in the exercise of reasonable care, to pre-
vent the injury.
Although the court ruled against RTD on its claims of governmen-
tal tort immunity based upon the Government Code provisions, the
ruling was a limited one. The holding was based only upon appeal of
a demurrer. During discovery it may be possible for RTD to unfold
facts that support their claim of immunity. The court decided only
that the complaint was sufficient to show the existence of a duty
owed to the plaintiffs, and that Government Code sections 820.2 and
845 did not bar the action.
JAMES B. BRISTOL
xiii. REAL PROPERTY LAW
A. In a commercial lease which conditions assignment on
the prior consent of the lessor, consent may not be
unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld: Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc.
In Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220
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Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985), the court, in a case of first impression, was
faced with the issue of whether an assignment consent clause gives a
commercial lessor absolute discretion to withhold consent to an as-
signment of a lease. Taking the position held by a minority of the
state courts, the court held that there was an implied reasonableness
standard in the consent clause and that consent could not unreasona-
bly be withheld unless the lessor has a valid objection to the assignee
or the proposed use.
The original lessee and the prospective lessee, Kendall, initiated
suit to compel the lessor, Ernest Pestana, Inc., to consent to an as-
signment of the lease. The lease contained a provision which re-
quired written consent of the lessor in order to assign the lease. The
lease also stated that failure to obtain such consent rendered the
lease voidable. From this the lessor asserted an absolute right to ar-
bitrarily and unreasonably refuse consent, and attempted to use the
consent provision to obtain increased rent and additional terms. As a
result, the potential assignees claimed that the lessor's arbitrary re-
fusal to consent to the assignment of the lease was an unreasonable
and unlawful restraint on alienation.
At trial the lessor demurred to the lessee's complaint and admitted
that its refusal was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court sus-
tained the lessor's demurrer without leave to amend. The court of
appeal affirmed this decision and applied the majority common law
rule that where an assignment clause conditions assignment on the
consent of the lessor, the lessor may withhold consent arbitrarily and
without regard to the qualifications of the proposed assignee, unless
there is a provision in the lease which provides that consent may not
be unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana,
Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 11, 209 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1984).
The supreme court reversed and adopted the minority rule, finding
that the policy reasons espoused by Ernest Pestana, Inc. in support of
the majority rule were no longer compelling. The decision to reject
the majority rule was based on the dual nature of a lease in contem-
porary society as both a conveyance of a leasehold interest and a
contract.
First, the court recognized that the rationale behind the majority
rule allowing arbitrary withholding of consent by lessors was to pro-
tect the lessor by giving him a necessary element of control over his
property and the parties to whom he must look to for performance of
the lease. However, the court found that in modern society this con-
cern is no longer of greater importance than the ban against unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
To bolster its decision, the court noted that several other jurisdic-
tions, both statutorily and judicially, have adopted the minority rule
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and that the minority rule is the position taken by the Restatement.
Restatement (Second) of Property § 15.2(2) (1977).
Second, the contractual nature of a lease and the increased recogni-
tion of the duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all con-
tracts led the court to find that, where a lessee is entitled to assign
his interest 'but has agreed to first obtain the lessor's consent, the
lessee has a contractual right to expect that consent will be exercised
in accordance with reasonable good faith standards.
The court then focused on the determination of when a lessor's re-
fusal to consent to assignment is reasonable. Although the court held
that denial based on personal taste and denial in order to raise rent
were commercially unreasonable, the ultimate determination was de-
termined to be a question of fact. Thus, the court in Kendall, by
adopting the minority rule, has joined the growing trend to value the
commercial lessee's right to assign or sublease over the lessor's right
to withhold consent at will.
CHRISTIE A. MOON
B. Where HUD takes over a project because permit
obtainer defaults on federally insured financing, and
subsequently sells the project, a conditional use permit
is not applicable to the present owners of the property:
Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. v. City of San Diego.
In Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 40 Cal. 3d
808, 710 P.2d 338, 221 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1985), the supreme court over-
turned an injunction which restricted the plaintiffs, owners of an
apartment complex, from renting their apartments to anyone except
senior citizens on a non-profit basis. The court determined that the
conditional use permit, which was formerly obtained by a nonprofit
organization for the purpose of constructing nonprofit senior citizen
apartments, did not limit plaintiffs in their use of the apartments be-
cause of subsequent transfers of ownership.
The Foundation for Specialized Group Housing applied to the City
of San Diego for a conditional use permit to construct a nonprofit se-
nior citizen apartment complex. The plans were approved and the
conditional use permit was issued but not recorded. See 66 Cal. Jur.
3d Zoning and Other Land Use Controls §§ 127, 128 (1981); 82 Am.
Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 281-87 (1976 & Supp. 1985). However,
the Foundation did not follow through on its plans. The complex was
ultimately built by Universal City, Inc., a profit-making corporation
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with private financing, and insured under section 221 of title II of the
National Housing Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1715(1) (1982). The developers
subsequently defaulted on this federally insured financing, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter HUD)
took over and operated the complex for three years, renting the
property to people twenty one and over.
The property was eventually refinanced by the plaintiffs, who later
applied to the City to convert the apartments into condominiums.
When their application was denied, they initiated this action to com-
pel the City to approve the conversion. The City filed a cross-com-
plaint seeking an injunction, which the trial court granted.
A conditional use permit is required when a use desired and per-
mitted could be incompatible with the applicable zoning. See County
of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal. 3d 505, 564 P.2d 14, 138 Cal. Rptr.
472 (1977). Thus, a permittee may make whatever uses of the prop-
erty the zoning ordinance allows, along with those uses authorized by
the permit, but nothing more or nothing less. See 101A C.JS. Zoning
and Land Planning §§ 228-293 (1979); 5 P. Witkin, Constitutional
Law §§ 465-480 (8th ed. 1964 & Supp. 1984).
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the nonprofit and
senior citizen requirements were not expressly enumerated as condi-
tions, but were mentioned only to describe the project, and thus,
should not be limitations. The court held that the uses of the prop-
erty, after the permit was issued, were limited to those allowed by
the zoning ordinance and those authorized by the permit, which
stated that the building was to be "a nonprofit senior citizen housing
project."
The court also found that, when read in light of its application, the
conditional use permit was not vague, uncertain, or unambiguous, but
was clear as to its terms because the permit incorporated the provi-
sions of section 231 of the Federal Housing Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1715(v)
(1982). Nevertheless, the court could not sustain the injunction on
the basis of the permit.
The court found that because the permit incorporated the provi-
sions of section 231, it had incorporated the provision which allowed
HUD to sell property in its discretion to profit-making organizations
to protect the financial interests of the government. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715(1) (1982). The court reasoned that plaintiffs were, therefore,
not in violation of any HUD restrictions.
The court concluded that the original owners did not build or oper-
ate the project in accordance with the permit. The failure of the de-
veloper to comply with the permit did not, however, justify
regulations other than those provided for by the permit because the
present owners did not fail to comply with the permit. Furthermore,
1184
[Vol. 13: 1101, 1986] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the subsequent events made the failure to comply with the permit in-
substantial. Therefore, the judgment enjoining plaintiffs from rent-
ing, except to senior citizens on a nonprofit basis, was reversed.
MARIE P. HENWOOD
XIV. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Interest of a bona fide purchaser of a vehicle subject to
registration under the Vehicle Code prevails over a
technically perfected security interest not disclosed on
the certificate of ownership: T & 0 Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
United California Bank.
In T & 0 Mobile Homes, Inc. v. United California Bank, 40 Cal. 3d
441, 709 P.2d 430, 220 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1985), the supreme court held
that a bona fide vehicle purchaser has priority over a perfected secur-
ity interest which is not listed on the ownership certificate. Pursuant
to the actual notice system employed by the vehicle code, a purchaser
may rely solely on the certificate of ownership. Because the lender
was responsible for insuring that the security interest was actually
recorded and listed on the certificate of ownership, the court held
that the lender should sustain the loss.
The Morgans obtained a personal loan from United California
Bank (hereinafter UCB) to finance the purchase of a mobile home.
UCB, which retained a security interest in the mobile home to secure
repayment, mailed a request to the Department of Motor Vehicles
(hereinafter DMV) to issue a new certificate identifying UCB as the
legal owner. However, the DMV erroneously mailed a new certifi-
cate which failed to state that UCB was the legal owner. The Mor-
gans subsequently sold the mobile home to T & 0 Mobile Homes,
Inc. without informing them of UCB's security interest. When the
DMV issued! another certificate, correctly identifying UCB as the
legal owner, UCB demanded possession of the mobile home. T & 0
then brought this action against the bank to have it declared the legal
owner and to enjoin the bank from repossessing the mobile home.
The trial court entered a judgment declaring UCB as the legal owner
and the supreme court reversed.
Pursuant to the commercial code, a security interest attaches when
the following conditions have been satisfied: 1) there is an express or
implied agreement that the security interest attach; 2) value must be
given; and 3) the debtor has rights in the collateral. See CAL. COM.
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CODE § 9203 (West Supp. 1986). Once a security interest has at-
tached, it must be perfected in order to be effective against creditors
and purchasers of the collateral. Generally, an attached security in-
terest is perfected when a financing statement has been filed in the
office under the secretary of state. Id. § 9401. Thus, under the con-
structive notice system, a purchaser must check a centralized system
to determine whether a security interest has been recorded.
However, at the time of the transaction, perfection of security in-
terests in mobile homes was governed by section 6301 of the Vehicle
Code. CAL. VEH. CODE § 6301 (West Supp. 1986). This section, which
relies on actual notice, requires that the secured party register di-
rectly with the DMV. Therefore, since all security interests are iden-
tified on the vehicle's certificate of ownership, a party may rely
solely on this certificate.
The principal dispute was whether T & 0, a bona fide purchaser,
or UCB, which maintained a perfected security interest, should sus-
tain the loss. In resolving this dispute, strong emphasis was placed
on T & O's right to rely solely on the certificate of ownership
presented by the Morgans. Since the certificate of ownership did not
list any security interests, T & 0 did not have a duty to investigate
the DMV's records. Further inquiry is required only if the seller is
unable to produce a certificate of ownership.
This holding applies to transactions involving vehicles subject to
registration under the vehicle code and to mobile home transactions
occurring prior to July 1, 1981. On this date, the registration of mo-
bile homes became subject to the Department of Housing and Com-
munity Development. The registration procedures are set forth in
the Health and Safety Code. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 18000-18124.5 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986). The new statutory
scheme provides for constructive rather than actual notice. Thus,
since July 1, 1981, a prospective purchaser of a mobile home can no
longer rely on the certificate of ownership. A purchaser now has a
duty to search the centralized housing system.
TAMI J. TAECKER
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xv. TORTS
Pharmacies are immune from strict liability in tort and
the market share theory was held inapplicable to a
manu4facturer with only a ten percent market share:
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,1 the supreme court held
that pharmacies are immune from strict liability in tort because
pharmacists provide professional services in contrast to merely facili-
tating a sale.2 The court also held that a ten percent share of the
DES market was not substantial enough to allow the plaintiff to re-
cover under the market share doctrine articulated in Sindell v. Ab-
bott Laboratories.3 Because the jury held that Squibb was not in fact
the manufacturer of the drug, the plaintiff was denied recovery on all
of her claims.4
This case arose after Christine Murphy filed a complaint alleging
that the drug DES,5 taken by her mother in 1951 and 1952 to prevent
a miscarriage, was the current cause of her clear cell adenocarci-
noma. She sought damages from both the Exclusive Prescription
Pharmacy Corporation and E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. on the basis of
strict liability for a defectively designed product.6 The plaintiff ini-
tially named Squibb as the manufacturer, but after the Sindell deci-
sion she amended her complaint to allege that she was not able to
identify the manufacturer, but that Squibb should nevertheless be re-
sponsible because it supplied a substantial percentage of the market
with the drug.7
1. 40 Cal. 3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985). The opinion was written
by Justice Mosk with Justice Reynoso concurring. Justices Grodin and Lucas both
filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Kaus filed a dissenting opinion, as did Chief
Justice Bird. Justices Kaus and Broussard concurred with the Chief Justice.
2. The court analogized pharmacy services to those of blood banks. The legisla-
ture has declared that the sale of blood is a service rather than a sale, thus allowing
immunity from strict liability in tort. Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d
744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977).
3. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
4. The jury returned a special verdict determining that the DES purchased by
the plaintiff', mother was not manufactured, processed, or distributed by Squibb.
Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 676, 710 P.2d at 249, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
5. "DES" is the common name for the drug Diethylstilbestrol, which is also
known as Stilbestrol.
6. The original complaint named Squibb as the manufacturer and Exclusive as
the retailer of the drug.
7. Market share liability is partially based on the risk-spreading theory. Since
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II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The first issue before the court was whether a pharmacy was the
type of retailer that should be held strictly liable in tort for injuries
caused by a defective product. California case law has consistently
held that retailers, as well as manufacturers, are liable for such inju-
ries.8 The defendant pharmacy claimed, however, that a pharmacist
performs a professional service rather than a retail sale, and there-
fore, should be exempt from strict liability for injuries from defective
drugs.9
Although this was a case of first impression in California, other
states have failed to find pharmacies strictly liable.10 Since the bene-
fits of prescription drugs outweigh the potential injuries which may
occur, unavoidably unsafe drugs are not defective if an adequate
warning is provided." The court found that a pharmacist engages in
a "hybrid enterprise" by performing services in counseling patients,
as well as the actual sale of prescription drugs.12 The court held that
the legislative characterization of a pharmacy as a health service can
be closely analogized to a similar characterization of blood transfu-
sions as a type of service exempt from strict liability. Relying on leg-
islative enactments, the court found that making sales would not
necessarily mean that a pharmacy should be strictly liable when it
performs a service just because a pharmacy is a retailer. Moreover, a
pharmacy's "services" are not limited to laboratory tests and injec-
tions, but are broadly defined to include the dispensing of drugs.S
each manufacturer gains from the sale of the product to the consumer, it should be
responsible for any negative consequences which may result. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at
612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
8. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964); Greenman v. Yuba Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
9. 40 Cal. 3d at 676, 710 P.2d at 249, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 449. Exclusive argued that,
just as doctors and hospitals are not liable for faulty drugs or needles because they pro-
vide a care service rather than a sale of those items, so too should a pharmacist who
provides the care and service in dealing with the drug be exempt from strict liability.
Id.
10. See McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Bichler v. Willing,
58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.2d 57 (1977); Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C.
App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977).
11. These cases rely on the Restatement of Torts, which requires a seller to warn
of defects he knew or should have known of. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment k (1977).
12. 40 Cal. 3d at 678, 710 P.2d at 251, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 451. The court acknowl-
edged that the pharmacist engages in the business of selling drugs, and that the serv-
ices performed are only in connection with the sale. Id. at 678-79, 710 P.2d at 251, 221
Cal. Rptr. at 451.
13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4046(b)(c) (West Supp. 1986). The court compared
this section with Health & Safety Code section 1606, which provides that the distribu-
tion of blood and blood products is to be considered a service and not a sale. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979).
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In finding the pharmacy immune from strict liability for the sale of
defective drugs, the court relied on policy considerations which affect
prescription. drugs. The court reasoned that most pharmacies, as
small business operations, would be unable to survive the potential
onslaught of lawsuits. This would result in the loss of a range of
drugstores amd drugs, including experimental drugs now available to
the public.14 The court theorized that the legislature may have in-
tended pharmacies to be exempt from strict liability because the abil-
ity to obtain prescription drugs outweighs the "advantage to the
individual consumer of being able to recover . . . on a strict liability
basis rather than . . . negligence."1 5 One commentator has pointed
out, however, that strict liability has not made small food dealers ex-
tinct, but has forced food retailers to exert a high duty of care. Be-
cause retailers can transfer liability to the manufacturers, the
argument favoring the retailer over the injured consumer is contrary
to the principles of tort liability.16
The second issue decided by the court was whether a ten percent
share of the consumer market was sufficient to allow recovery based
on the Sindell market share theory.17 Under the Sindell approach, a
plaintiff need not prove which company manufactured the DES caus-
ing the injury. However, if enough manufacturers are joined as de-
fendants so that a "substantial share" of the market was represented,
damages are apportioned according to each manufacturer's market
share.' 8 The court held that because Squibb had only a ten percent
14. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 680-81, 710 P.2d at 252-53, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 452-53. The
court also did not want the pharmacist, who merely fulfills the doctor's order, to bear
the burden in the event both the doctor and manufacturer escape liability. Id. at 681,
710 P.2d at 253, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
15. Id. at 680, 710 P.2d at 252, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 452. The court also feared that
druggists might use only the most expensive drugs from the most reputable companies
in order to lessen their risks, thereby forcing the consumer to incur higher costs. Id. at
681, 710 P.2d at 253, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
16. See Comment, Retail Druggist's Warranty of Drugs, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
285, 291 (1966). Retailers are also able to transfer any losses to the public as a whole
instead of having individuals bear the burden of injuries. This is one of the fundamen-
tal policies of tort law. Rather than guarding consumers against high drug prices, the
concern for human life and safety should require druggists to deal only with legitimate
wholesalers offering the maximum in consumer protection against defective drugs. Id.
17. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980); see also Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982).
18. The Sindell court held that it was necessary to join as defendants a group of
manufacturers having a "substantial share" of the DES market. Market share appor-
tionment was also adopted in New Jersey in a similar case. See Ferringo v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
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market share, there was a ninety percent chance some other com-
pany or companies were responsible for the injuries. 19 Therefore,
since the plaintiff failed to meet the "threshold" requirements for ap-
plication of the market share doctrine, and since she could not prove
that Squibb had caused the injuries, her claims for relief failed. 20
III. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
In his concurrence, Justice Grodin noted that pharmacists are al-
ready subjected to a strict regulatory scheme that other retailers are
not. Furthermore, it would be unfair to hold a pharmacist liable for
following the orders of a doctor who is exempt from strict liability.21
He emphasized that there is nothing in any decision of any state, in-
cluding California, that either directly or even by analogy suggests
that pharmacists selling prescription drugs should be held strictly
liable.22
Justice Lucas wrote a separate concurring opinion stating that the
rule should be that the "sale of a service does not render one liable
'in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct.' "23 Justice
Lucas further added that since the legislature has specifically held
that pharmacists provide services, they cannot be held strictly
liable.24
Justice Kaus authored a dissenting opinion. He noted that under
the Restatement of Torts, which has generally held retailers strictly
liable, there exists no reason to exempt retail pharmacists because
they certainly constitute a link in the marketing chain.25 He likened
prescription drugs to other tools used by doctors and dentists, and
concluded that just because such a tool is used in connection with a
service, there is no reason to exempt a retailer from liability if the
product causes injuries. 26 Under the market share theory, each man-
ufacturer is liable for its proportionate share of the damages. There-
fore Justice Kaus argued that failing to join other manufacturers
should not defeat the cause of action. He would simply limit plain-
19. For a discussion of whether Squibb should nonetheless have been liable for ten
percent of the plaintiff's injuries see Robinson, supra note 17, at 752-53.
20. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 676, 710 P.2d at 249, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
21. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4036(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1986); see also Gagne v.
Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95
Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
22. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 686, 710 P.2d at 256, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
23. Id. at 687-88, 710 P.2d at 257, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (Lucas, J., concurring).
24. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4046(b), (c) (West Supp. 1986).
25. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 700-01, 710 P.2d at 267, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (Kaus, J.,
dissenting). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) comment f (1977).
26. Justice Kaus would not find retailer liability if the manufacturer was found
blameless. However, if the manufacturer is found strictly liable, so too should the re-
tailer bear the burden of marketing a defective product.
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tiff's recovery to Squibb's market share.27
Chief Justice Bird also wrote a dissenting opinion. She would have
reversed the judgment in favor of the defendant pharmacy "because
every one of the policies served by strict liability would be advanced
by applying the doctrine to the sale of a defective prescription drug
by a retail druggist .. ,"28 According to the Chief Justice, strict lia-
bility serves as an effective incentive to produce safe products and to
spread the loss among all consumers to avoid having individuals incur
overwhelming misfortunes. 29 The retailer is best situated to control
the risk, to prevent and warn of the danger, and to assume the cost of
the injury, all of which would be incentives to design and disseminate
safe products. According to the court in Sindell, "[t]hese considera-
tions are particularly significant where medication is involved, for
the consumer is virtually helpless to protect himself from serious,
sometimes permanent, sometimes fatal injuries caused by deleterious
drugs."30 The major policies for creating strict liability, which are
compensation, incentive, and cost spreading, are not even addressed
in the majority opinion even though they are applicable in this case. 3'
Chief Justice Bird also noted that the court's reliance on comment
k of the Reatatement of Torts is an interpretation inconsistent with
the seminal strict liability case of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.32
Comment k assumes that all prescription drugs are unavoidably un-
safe, and therefore are not subject to strict liability if there is an ade-
quate warning. The court in Barker, on the other hand, held that
strict liability can attach if a product is unsafe, even upon hindsight,
if the defective design caused the injury, and if the benefits do not
outweigh the risks.33 Furthermore, the court had previously reached
a conclusion contrary to the Restatement, and therefore should rely
on the Barker reasoning to find DES a defective product under a
strict liability theory.34
27. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 701-02, 710 P.2d at 267-68, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 467-68 (Kaus,
J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 6:39, 710 P.2d at 258, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
31. Both the Sindell and the Escola courts identified these policy considerations.
See id.; Escola 1r. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
32. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) comment k (1977).
33. See generally Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443; 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978).
34. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
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Chief Justice Bird criticized the court's conclusion that a pharma-
cist performs a service when, as the majority clearly states, the ser-
vice is incidental to the sale.35 The court claimed that the pharmacist
is a highly skilled professional, but then discounted any professional
responsibility by claiming that the prescriptions are merely filled on
the order of a doctor.36 She also found fault with the statutory com-
parisons because a blood transfusion is clearly "not to be considered a
sale" and no such comparable language exists for the transfer of a
prescription drug.37
Finally, Chief Justice Bird added that there was no evidence to
show that imposing strict liability on a retail pharmacy would put
them out of business, leave thousands of persons without essential
drugs, or raise the prices so high as to confer great hardships. For
example, auto retailers remain in business, and automobiles are avail-
able at affordable prices even though those retailers have been sub-
ject to strict liability since 1964.38 Therefore, Chief Justice Bird
would hold the retail pharmacy responsible for shouldering the bur-
den of strict liability and not the injured consumer.
IV. CONCLUSION
A sharply divided court did not allow the plaintiff to recover
against either the pharmacy which dispensed the drug or a manufac-
turer who had ten percent of the market share of the product. The
court reached this decision despite the fact that other types of retail-
ers have been subject to strict liability claims for over twenty years,
and despite the five year old doctrine of market share liability. The
court offered no reasoning as to why the plaintiff could not collect
against Squibb for ten percent of her damages in relation to their ten
percent of the market other than the fact that manufacturers with a
substantial share of the market were not joined. Nor did the court
adequately address the plaintiff's inability to name the manufacturer.
This contrasts its previous acceptance of a recovery based on a mar-
ket share. The court did not even attempt to reconcile its decision
with previous policies of allowing the closest link, the retailer, to be
sued in order to spread the cost and diminish the individual burden.
35. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 678-79, 710 P.2d at 251, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 451 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
36. Id.
37. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4046 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986).
38. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
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This decision is a definite step backward in California's previously
progressive products liability trend.
CYNTHIA M. WALKER
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